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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive 
Waste Management is in the process of preparing the Yucca Mountain license 
application for submission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the nation’s 
first geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste.
Because the DOE SNF will be part of the license application, there are various 
components of the license application that will require information relative to the 
DOE SNF. The National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) is the 
organization that directs the research, development, and testing of treatment,
shipment, and disposal technologies for all DOE SNF. This report documents the
work activities conducted by the NSNFP and discusses the relationship between 
these NSNFP technical activities and the license application. A number of the 
NSNFP activities were performed to provide risk insights and understanding of 
DOE SNF disposal as well as to prepare for anticipated questions from the 
regulatory agency.
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ACRONYMS
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
CFR Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
DOE sites Refers to the three sites indicated in the DOE Record of Decision to regionalize spent 
nuclear fuel management: Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (previously Idaho National Engineering Laboratory), and Savannah River Site 
EM Office of Environmental Management
FEP features, events, and processes 
HIC high-integrity can
HLW high-level waste
INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
M&O management and operating (contractor) 
MCO multi-canister overpack
MGR monitored geologic repository
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NSNFP National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program
QA quality assurance
RW Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
SNF spent nuclear fuel 
SSC systems, structures, and components
TRIGA Training Research Isotopes—General Atomic
TSPA total system performance assessment 
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NSNFP Activities in Support of Repository Licensing 
for Disposal of DOE SNF 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) was formally establisheda in 1995 as the 
result of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) settlement agreement1 between the State of Idaho, U.S. Department 
of Energy (DOE), and the United States Navy. Since its inception, the NSNFP has directed the research, 
development, and testing of treatment, shipment, and disposal technologies for all DOE SNF. The 
program operates under the direction of the Manager, DOE Idaho Operations Office (NE-ID).2 The 
NSNFP was directed by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) to coordinate the functions 
necessary to disposition DOE SNF. The NSNFP has been coordinating with the DOE SNF sites (Hanford, 
the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory [INEEL], and the Savannah River Site) to 
achieve its goal of dispositioning DOE SNF in a monitored geologic repository (MGR). NSNFP is 
working closely with the DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to meet this goal. 
The primary purpose of this report is to present the most significant NSNFP technical activities 
that have been completed by the NSNFP in support of the repository license application at Yucca 
Mountain for DOE SNF. Secondly, this report will discuss the relationship between the NSNFP technical 
activities and the license application. 
Several of the NSNFP activities were performed to provide risk insights and a comprehensive 
understanding of DOE SNF disposal as well as to prepare for questions from the regulatory agency. Thus, 
when appropriate, this report will also identify how the NSNFP activities: 
x Help determine the important DOE SNF disposal parameters, models, and assumptions 
x Support the comprehensive understanding of the impact of including DOE SNF in the repository 
system. 
1.1 Background 
After President Bush signed the House Joint Resolution 873 on July 23, 2002, RW proceeded with 
the license application process for the proposed MGR at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Figure 1-1 is a 
summary diagram providing a high-level timeline and milestones for RW to move forward with the 
license application. The lower half of Figure 1-1 highlights the NSNFP activities that support the 
disposition of DOE SNF in the repository. These activities correspond to the RW milestones at the top of 
the figure. Basically, the process entails:  
x Submitting a license application 
x Receiving a construction authorization from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
x Submitting a license amendment to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct 
material, including SNF and high-level waste (HLW) 
x Amending the license for permanent closure 
x Requesting an amendment to terminate the license (to close the repository).  
a. NSNFP activities were initiated in 1993, and the NSNFP organization was formalized in the 1995 settlement agreement. 
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Figure 1-1. Repository timeline and milestones including the NSNFP activities supporting the milestones.
In July 2003, based on the final rule 10 CFR Part 63, the NRC issued the Yucca Mountain Review
Plan.4 This plan provides guidance for the NRC staff to evaluate the DOE license application for the 
proposed Yucca Mountain repository. Figure 1-2 lists the detailed review topics and areas defined in the 
Yucca Mountain Review Plan.
In anticipation of the license application review by the NRC, RW has issued the Yucca Mountain
Project Licensing Strategy.5 This document describes the overall approach RW will use during the
licensing process for a geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Figure 1-3 lists the RW key
documents that support the license application as described in the Yucca Mountain Project Licensing 
Strategy.
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Figure 1-3. Key documents that support the licensing application—from Yucca Mountain Project
Licensing Strategy (* = Documents with DOE SNF input). 
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As part of the disposal technologies responsibility, the NSNFP performs a number of technical 
activities to ensure that all the DOE SNF destined for direct disposition is considered and included in the
nation’s first MGR planning and licensing process. As required, these activities were performed either by
the NSNFP under the NSNFP quality assurance (QA) program procedures or the RW’s QA program
procedures. To date, these NSNFP activities have supported the inclusion of DOE SNF in the following
repository activities. 
x Viability assessment (1998) 
x Environmental Impact Statement (2002) 
x Site recommendation (2002)
x License application (planned December 2004).
A number of NSNFP technical activities provided the necessary input to RW’s key licensing 
documents to ensure that DOE SNF types have been evaluated adequately in the repository license 
application. The required areas of DOE SNF input for the NRC review topics in Figure 1-2 and key RW 
documents in Figure 1-3 are identified by an asterisk (). These NSNFP activities are summarized in this 
report.
DOE RW plans to submit a license application to the NRC by December 2004. The NSNFP and 
the DOE SNF sites have been working with RW and its management and operating (M&O) contractor to 
understand and complete the various technical activities that are required to support the inclusion of the
DOE SNF into the license application.
Since 1995, a number of the activities were performed to support the viability of the Yucca 
Mountain site as a repository and in support of the site recommendation process outlined by law. Viability
assessment and site recommendation activities provided insights to the behaviors of DOE SNF, and they
will be discussed here if they are used as part of the supporting evidence in the license application.
However, this report discusses primarily the activities that support development of the license application. 
1.2 Scope 
This report discusses activities that support the disposition of all the DOE SNF that is destined for 
the repository. Currently, there are approximately 2,400 MTHM DOE SNF (excluding naval fuel)
identified in the NSNFP report, Source Term Estimates for DOE Spent Nuclear Fuels,
DOE/SNF/REP-078, Revision 1.6
This report has been organized to provide a summary of the significant NSNFP activities 
performed to date and a summary of the DOE SNF licensing strategy. When appropriate, detailed 
discussion of the NSNFP activities in support of the DOE SNF licensing strategy are covered in the 
appendixes.
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2. NSNFP ACTIVITY SUMMARY
Since 1995, the NSNFP has directed research, development, and testing activities to address 
treatment, storage, shipment, and disposal technology needed for disposition of all DOE SNF. This 
section briefly describes the key technical activities performed since the inception of the NSNFP. These 
activity summaries provide a historic perspective as to how NSNFP activities evolved through the 
repository viability assessment, site recommendation, to the current license application process. 
The current NSNFP activities are based on the DOE SNF strategy covered in Section 3. Detailed 
discussions of the current DOE SNF licensing strategy activities include preclosure safety (Appendix A) , 
postclosure TSPA (Appendix B), and pre- and postclosure criticality activities (Appendix C). Each of the 
following subsections provides a short description, the reason for the work, and its status or outcome.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the major activities described in this section. 
2.1 Project Integration and Interfaces 
2.1.1 DOE SNF Licensing Strategy
The overall objective of the DOE SNF licensing strategy is to ensure safety of repository
personnel, the environment, and the public while minimizing the need for additional characterization of 
DOE SNF. This is accomplished through reliance on the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) and 
barriersb for preclosure safety and postclosure waste isolation. This reliance on SSCs and barriers rather 
than DOE SNF characteristics is the basic philosophy applied to the DOE SNF licensing strategy. A well 
developed licensing strategy allows the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) to safely
dispose of DOE SNF that is destined for the MGR without expensive treatment or processing. Further 
discussions of the DOE SNF licensing strategy are covered in Section 3. 
2.1.2 NSNFP Quality Assurance
The NSNFP instituted a QA Program when it initiated SNF research and development activities 
in 1993. The NSNFP implemented and maintains an effective QA program in all aspects of its work that 
may affect the safety and protection of workers, the public, or the environment. As part of the NSNFP QA 
program, the NSNFP has the responsibility to verify that each of the DOE sites implemented the RW 
Quality Assurance Requirements and Description7 for their activities. As directed by EM, this
responsibility was transferred to the EM/RW QA Oversight Team8 in April 2004. 
Today, the NSNFP QA program is prescribed in the NSNFP Quality Assurance Program Plan9
(QAPP). The QAPP describes the NSNFP QA policy, the NSNFP organization structure, the internal and 
external QA interfaces, the general QA program principles applicable to the scope for the NSNFP 
mission, and the roles and responsibilities of the NSNFP with respect to QA. The NSNFP adopts the 
principles defined by the Quality Assurance Requirements and Description for engineering and design-
related activities intended to guide the development of a path forward for successful disposition of DOE 
SNF. It includes a formal document control process and training system. Work performed by the NSNFP 
that is relied on to develop design requirements and to demonstrate DOE SNF compliance with repository
acceptance requirements is subject to the Quality Assurance Requirements and Description. The NSNFP 
implements QA requirements by complying with NSNFP procedures. 
b. Any material, structure, or feature that for a period to be determined by the NRC prevents or substantially reduces the rate of
movement of water or radionuclides from the Yucca Mountain repository to the accessible environment or prevents the release of 
radionuclides from the waste, 10 CFR 63.2. 
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Figure 2-1. NSNFP elements and activities. 
2.1.3 Memorandum of Agreement
Through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for Acceptance of Department of Energy Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10 RW and EM seek to achieve safe and timely disposal
of DOE SNF and HLW by identifying data needs, interfaces and acceptance criteria and developing 
compliance procedures needed to support both the geologic repository construction authorization and 
license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the transportation system necessary
to transfer DOE SNF and HLW to an RW facility.
This MOA states the policy that “EM and RW will cooperate to ensure that all current and future 
activities relating to acceptance of DOE SNF and HLW continue to be performed in a safe, secure, cost-
effective manner, in accordance with applicable requirements, and in a manner that contributes toward a 
public understanding and acceptance of DOE goals and activities. EM and RW will provide mutual
support for budget justification to the Office of Management and Budget, and hearings before Congress to 
implement the MOA, to the extent consistent with their individual missions.”
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2.1.4 Interface Control Document
The integrated Interface Control Document Volume (1)11 was initially issued in 1999 and then
updated in 2002. It records and implements interface agreements associated with the receipt and handling
by the MGR of DOE SNF, naval SNF, and HLW. 
In addition, this Interface Control Document included agreements between RW, EM, and the 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program on each organization’s responsibilities for control of the mechanical 
and physical interfaces. The integrated Interface Control Document Volume (1) was prepared based on 
the RW/EM relationship that was defined in the memoranda of agreement between EM and RW (see 
Reference 10.) 
2.1.5 Master Logic Schedule 
To coordinate the activities being performed to disposition DOE SNF, the NSNFP produced a 
Master Logic Schedule and interface schedule. The Master Logic Schedule is updated annually to help the 
DOE SNF sites, the NSNFP, and RW to evaluate and integrate the activities required to dispose of all 
DOE SNF at the MGR. 
2.1.6 Guidance Document
The NSNFP also developed a guidance document as an early attempt to define the minimum data 
needed for acceptance of DOE SNF in the proposed MGR. The guidance document identified an
extensive list of DOE SNF data initially considered necessary for waste acceptance. However, with the 
development of the DOE standard canisterc and the DOE SNF licensing strategy, the minimum data 
needed for DOE SNF have been significantly reduced, and the guidance document is no longer required 
to support waste acceptance.
2.1.7 High Priority Performance Parameters 
In 1995, based on 10 CFR Part 60, the NSNFP identified a number of parameters that were 
considered important to the acceptance of DOE SNF in the proposed MGR. These parameters included 
pressurization, radioactive releases from particulates, and combustibility. Together with the RW M&O, a 
number of evaluations were conducted to determine the impact of these parameters. However, the 
publication of NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 63 in 2001 (which is performance based) and the 
development of the DOE standard canister changed the licensing focus. The need to consider these 
performance parameters changed from licensing analysis to providing risk insights.
2.1.8 Technology Integration Plan 
In the early 1990s, each DOE site was developing its technology development needs for interim
storage of its SNF. Funds were being requested on an individual site basis to address these needs, 
sometimes resulting in dual funding for the same technology development. One of the first tasks assigned 
to the NSNFP in 1994 was to establish a common and consistent technical basis for technology
development; integrate the DOE complexwide efforts; and develop a timely, cost-effective technical
solution for DOE SNF management. The NSNFP provided this information to the DOE SNF management 
through the development of the DOE-Owned Spent Nuclear Fuel Technology Integration Plan.12
c. The term DOE standard canister refers to both the DOE standardized canister and the multi-canister overpack.
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This report documented the systematic methodology used to a) identify the SNF technology
needs, b) identify the associated cost and schedules, and c) prioritize the identified technology 
development needs. The technology needs identified ranged from resolving existing storage issues to new 
treatment technologies needed to prepare SNF for disposal. DOE SNF site management and EM 
headquarters staff used this document for fiscal planning of technology development needs after it was 
issued.
2.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Packaging 
As part of the initial plan to address interim storage, spent fuel packaging needed to be integrated 
with repository acceptance. The NSNFP began to integrate interim storage plans with repository 
acceptance criteria resulting in road-ready packaging concepts. 
2.2.1 DOE Standard Canisters 
DOE plans to package SNF into two types of stainless steel canisters. Most of the fuel will be 
packages in a DOE standardized canister. The N-reactor and a small amount of other SNF will be 
packaged into the MCO. The remainder of this report will refer to both as standard canisters. 
The NSNFP initiated research and development activities on a single multi-purpose canister to 
package all the DOE SNF types. In 1997, the NSNFP began to develop and test a standardized canister 
concept and provide guidance relative to the internal basket. The DOE standardized canister was
developed to minimize fuel handling during interim storage, transport, and final disposal operations. The 
canister incorporates an energy absorbing skirt that protects the heads and shell during a potential drop or
sudden impact. The standardized canister is sufficient to withstand operational loads and accidental drops 
while maintaining containment.
In parallel, Hanford was developing a multi-canister overpack (MCO) to repackage N-reactor fuel 
and move it from water-filled basins near the Columbia River to a dry storage facility. The MCO was 
initially designed for interim storage to satisfy a near-term need to move the N-reactor fuel. The NSNFP 
performed an early review of the MCO and determined that a minor change to the MCO internal baskets 
design would increase the probability that it could be transported in a horizontal configuration to the 
repository at a later date. The NSNFP has demonstrated that the MCO can meet the operational loads and 
accidental drops at the repository surface facility and will be analyzing the MCO for transportation loads 
in the near future. 
The overall integrity of the DOE standard canister was demonstrated through analytical modeling
and multiple drop tests at varying impact angles followed by helium leak testing. The DOE standard 
canister is a key component in the licensing strategy for DOE SNF. A more detailed description of the 
canister and its development is found in Appendix A.
2.2.1.1 Material Interaction. For the DOE standard canisters, internal interactions considered the 
chemical, physical, and thermodynamic properties of the materials to be stored inside the canisters. 
Degradation mechanisms that were considered include: electrochemical interactions, such as general 
corrosion, pitting corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking; mechanical forces, such as overpressurization; 
and metallurgical degradation such as hydrogen embrittlement, liquid metal embrittlement, and thermal 
effects due to welding. It was concluded that there are no significant degradation mechanisms that would 
fail a standardized canister or MCO at nominal repository temperatures of 200qC or even as high as 
350qC. It was further concluded that neither the proposed DOE standardized canister constructed of 
Type 316L stainless steel nor the MCO made with Type 304L stainless steel is expected to be susceptible
to liquid metal embrittlement due to the presence of cesium and rubidium from the fuel. The canister 
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shells are immune to stress corrosion cracking from cesium/rubidium hydroxide based on the experiments
performed by the NSNFP. After drying and inerting, the DOE standard canister degradation is considered 
negligible.
In 2001, the NSNFP initiated drying studies and began to generate consensus standards for 
dryness of SNF for packaging SNF in the DOE standard canisters. The standard guide on drying13
behavior of SNF is intended to provide DOE sites and regulators with consistent guidance for the 
evaluation of SNF dryness. 
2.2.1.2 High Strain Testing. The use of finite element analysis for elastic structural response has 
been successfully used in numerous industries including the nuclear power industry. Full confidence
exists in the technology’s ability to provide acceptable answers. Additional testing was necessary to 
obtain a similar level of confidence for plastic analysis technology.
The NSNFP has embarked on an effort to develop material data to support modification to the
stress-strain curve to account for strain rate effects under moderate strain rates. This material data will be 
based on limited dynamic material testing at strain levels and strain rates approximating what the DOE 
standard canister is expected to experience during accidental drop events. These strain and strain-rate 
values will be determined from the applicable canister analytical evaluations performed to date, which 
used plastic analysis techniques using ABAQUS/Explicit software.
Material testing will be performed using an impact test machine developed by the INEEL. These 
impact responses will then be compared to the stress-strain results of a quasi-static tensile test of the same 
material. These data will be used to confirm the plastic analysis values used in the canister analysis.
2.2.1.3 Thermal Analysis. Two thermal analyses were performed in 1998 to evaluate the
allowable decay heat values that could be supported by the DOE standardized canisters and the NSNFP 
conceptual transportation cask. The first analysis determined the allowable decay heat value that could be 
supported by the DOE standardized canister oriented vertically in ambient air at 21qC (70qF). The second
analysis determined the allowable decay heat value such that under steady state conditions with nine DOE 
standardized canisters arranged inside a transportation cask, a maximum temperature of 316qC (600qF)
occurs in the stainless steel wall of any DOE standard canisters. These analyses determined what kind of 
administrative controls are needed during the transportation of the DOE standardized canister in a cask. 
The results of the analyses are documented in a letter report.14
2.2.2 High Integrity Can 
The NSNFP began the development of a small diameter, high integrity can (HIC) in 1998. The
intent of the HIC was to provide containment of items that may not meet the requirements for storage, 
transportation, or disposal. Specifically, the NSNFP developed the HIC for the handling and packaging of 
failed fuel and other radioactive materials such as: particulate, sectioned pieces, rubble, melted or highly
degraded elements, unclad uranium alloys, and chemically reactive fuels. A feasibility study15 was 
performed to evaluate the development of a HIC. Developers completed the first HIC in 2001 for the 
packaging of sectioned TRIGA rods. With the development of the DOE standard canisters, the need for 
additional protection by the HIC is no longer required.
2.2.3 Weld Development
Closure welding is the final step in sealing the DOE standardized canister. To optimize its 
volume, the canister does not incorporate shielding. Without shielding, the DOE standardized canister 
must be closed and welded remotely. In 2000, the NSNFP began to develop a remote welding technology
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to support the DOE standardized canister closure process. This technology includes a welding and
nondestructive examination process to perform and inspect closure welds. The method is being developed 
to meet the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) fabrication code requirements. It is also 
being developed to minimize weld heat input and metallurgical structure interruption, and to minimize
radiation exposure to operation personnel. Prototype demonstrations of the system have begun. 
2.2.4 Advanced Neutron Absorber Development
The NSNFP began developing a neutron absorbing structural material in 1999 to support nuclear
criticality safety for interim storage, transport, and final disposal of SNF. Researchers are developing a 
corrosion-resistant, nickel-chromium-molybdenum alloy containing gadolinium for criticality control in the
DOE standard canister. Gadolinium is a neutron-absorbing element that has the highest available neutron
absorption cross section. The gadolinium must be alloyed into a corrosion-resistant structural metal that will
meet ASME, Section 2 code requirements to be used as a structural material.
This alloy will be used for the internal baskets of the DOE standardized canister to provide 
structural support and geometry control and to ensure nuclear criticality safety. Use of poison inside the 
canister allows higher fissile loading per canister. This will reduce the number of canisters and waste 
packages needed for DOE SNF disposal. Researchers are working to define the chemistry ranges and 
minimum mechanical properties for the ASME code case. 
2.3 Repository Analyses
For the DOE SNF to be included in the MGR baseline, a series of analyses were required to show
that DOE SNF does not impact repository performance. This section discusses the NSNFP activities that 
support repository analyses.
2.3.1 SNF Database
 In 1993, the NSNFP created the Spent Fuel Database to provide a single source of DOE EM site 
data to make management decisions for handling, storage, transport, and disposal of SNF. The Spent Fuel 
Database contains quantitative and characteristic SNF information for all DOE-owned or managed SNF 
and provides the ability to search on a wide range of parameters. The database is updated periodically and 
a reference version was generated to support the license application. 
2.3.2 Fuel Grouping
The DOE SNF inventory is diverse. This large number of DOE SNF types posed a challenge in 
the number of analyses needed. The necessary analyses were simplified by using the information from the 
Spent Fuel Database to group the DOE SNF and to facilitate preclosure safety analysis (also known as 
design basis event), postclosure total system performance assessment (TSPA) analysis, and criticality
analysis. DOE SNF was grouped by similar materials of construction, fuel meats, enrichments, etc. This 
resulted in a small number of representative groups for analyses. The results are discussed in Appendixes
A and B. 
2.3.3 Source Term Development 
The source term development activity provided an estimate of radionuclide inventories that are 
used to support determination of the radiological doses associated with preclosure and postclosure 
repository safety, the decay heat for thermal analyses of casks and storage canisters, and photon emission
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spectra for shielding calculations. The development, application, and results of the methodology
employed for the estimates are discussed in Appendix D.
2.3.4 Preclosure Safety Analysis (Design Basis Events) 
Design basis events analysis was performed to identify risks and to establish the associated
administrative and operational controls needed to ensure safety during SNF receipt and handling 
(repository preclosure operations). In 1998, the NSNFP began participating in repository design basis 
events analysis with the objective of demonstrating that DOE SNF will not adversely affect repository
safety during credible repository events. The NSNFP has demonstrated that the DOE standard canister 
provides radionuclide containment during credible preclosure events. The NSNFP performed analyses
that provide risk insights associated with receipt and handling of DOE SNF. The preclosure safety
strategy for DOE SNF and associated analyses are discussed in Appendix A. 
2.3.4.1 Chemical Reactivity Analysis. Other preclosure safety considerations included the 
possibility of a fire resulting from a pyrophoric reaction involving uranium metal SNF. Fuels with 
damaged cladding can accumulate uranium hydride on their surface if they react with water while in 
storage. The repository staff conducted simplified analyses to assess the potential impacts of this event 
sequence. These analyses conservatively assumed ignition and complete combustion of an MCO full of 
N-reactor SNF in the repository surface facilities. No credit was taken for high-efficiency particulate air 
filtration or other natural and engineered barriers to mitigate the consequences. Because these analyses
indicated that the potential energy and radiological materials released from this event were unacceptable,
chemical reactivity analyses were undertaken to develop a more accurate assessment of the potential for 
pyrophoric reaction associated with receipt and handling of uranium metal SNF. The analysis results 
showed that for a sustained reaction to occur, two holes must be present in the SNF canister to allow a 
flow path through the SNF. The holes allow the inflow of reactant gas and outflow of reaction products, 
necessary to support the reaction. Holes of less than 0.75 inches retarded gas flow sufficiently to make the 
reaction self-controlled and not sustainable. This analysis, coupled with the no canister breach approach 
to the license, eliminated chemical reactivity as a licensing issue. Chemical reactivity analysis is further 
discussed in Appendix D.
2.3.5 Postclosure Total Systems Performance Assessment 
The TSPA activities were performed to confirm that DOE SNF can safely be emplaced in a 
geologic repository. The TSPA activities predict how well the repository’s engineered and natural barriers 
will contain the DOE SNF over the 10,000-year regulatory period. The NSNFP performed iterative 
analyses to:
x Determine if DOE SNF would affect any of the repository features, events, and processes (FEPs)
x Retain and evaluate only those FEPs with probabilities >10-8 per year, or significantly change 
radiological exposure or radionuclide releases 
x Determine if the repository can still meet environmental safety and health requirements by
including the various DOE SNF types. 
The NSNFP has performed TSPA activities in support of both the site recommendation and license
application processes. The postclosure safety strategy and related analyses are presented in Appendix B. 
2.3.5.1 Features, Events, and Processes. 10 CFR 63.114(e) and (f) require that the repository
performance assessment provides the technical basis for either inclusion or exclusion of specific FEPs. 
DOE/SNF/REP-091 September 2004
Revision 0 Page 25 of 36
Specific FEPs must be included in TSPA analyses if the magnitude and time of the resulting radiological
exposures would be significantly changed by their omission. The repository performance assessment
provides the technical basis for either inclusion or exclusion of degradation, deterioration, or alteration 
processes of engineered barriers, including those processes that would adversely affect the performance of 
natural barriers. Degradation, deterioration, or alteration processes of engineered barriers were evaluated 
in detail if the magnitude and time of the resulting radiological exposures would be significantly changed 
by their omission. RW completed this screening for the commercial SNF.
The DOE SNF FEPs activity evaluated the impact of the addition of DOE SNF into the proposed
repository. This activity identified the FEPs that should be analyzed to provide the basis for RW to 
determine if the FEPs need inclusion in the performance assessment. Appendix B further discusses the 
FEPs activity for DOE SNF. 
2.3.5.2 Corrosion Data Report. The behaviors of the DOE SNF in the TSPA were investigated
through the use of a literature search to help understand how the various DOE SNF types may behave under
repository conditions. The results of the literature search were published in two reports.16,17 These reports, in
concert with the other postclosure activities, will provide NRC the confidence that EM understands the
behaviors of DOE SNF. Further discussion of this and other related works are covered in Appendix B.
2.3.5.3 Release Rate Testing. From 1998 through 2002, the NSNFP provided support to the
repository license application process by determining the expected release rate of radionuclides from SNF. 
These release rates support the prediction of the radiation dose rate at the repository boundary and
assessment of the potential impact to criticality safety. This work was performed to establish a technical
basis for the degradation and release rate predictions for performance assessment of the repository system.
Through 2002, the NSNFP performed tests on mixed-oxide fuel, uranium metal fuel, and 
aluminum clad fuel. Three primary tests supported the fuel degradation and release rate studies: drip 
testing, flow-through testing, and batch testing. These tests18 provided data related to corrosion 
mechanisms, reaction products, and the retention and release of selected radionuclides. The data obtained 
from these tests were used to increase confidence in SNF performance assessment models. Release rate
testing is further discussed in Appendix B.
2.3.6 Criticality Analyses
Criticality analyses were needed to support the repository license application and ensure safe 
DOE SNF handling and transport. In 1994, the NSNFP initiated criticality analyses in an effort to ensure 
safe handling during storage, transport, and disposal of DOE SNF and to define the appropriate criticality
controls needed in the waste package design. Criticality analyses have been key in the development of the 
DOE standard canister and internal baskets. Initial analyses also led to the development of the advanced 
neutron absorber material. Analytical bases were established to group the many SNF types and focus 
analyses on the most reactive SNF types in each of nine fuel groups. 
These criticality analyses have contributed to the development of safe fuel packaging guidelines
by establishing fissile material limits and neutron poisoning requirements. These guidelines19 form the 
basis for safe interim storage, transport, and repository emplacement. Appendix C further discusses the 
criticality activities. 
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2.4 License Application Support, 
Waste Acceptance, and Transportation 
2.4.1 License Application/Request for Additional Information Support 
Since FY 2003, the NSNFP has been coordinating the license application review for the EM 
organization. RW and its M&O contractor developed a license application review process to ensure the 
technical accuracy of the license application. The NSNFP coordinates the process by providing the 
license application materials to designated EM personnel for review when each section or chapter 
becomes available. These include the federal and contractor personnel at each DOE site, and EM 
Headquarters personnel in both the SNF and HLW programs. The NSNFP collects all the comments from
the reviewers, resolves inconsistent comments, consolidates comments, and submits them for resolution 
to RW. The NSNFP represents EM and participates in the EM comment resolutions.
The NSNFP will continue this support through completion of the license application. The NSNFP
will answer NRC’s request for additional information regarding the DOE SNF. The NSNFP will perform
additional DOE SNF analysis as required to address NRC’s requests. 
2.4.2 Waste Acceptance
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act limits repository inventories to those wastes that meet the legal 
definition of SNF or HLW. It is critical that this fundamental requirement flows down to the Waste
Acceptance element and be a central discriminator in what types of waste are accepted into the MGR.
2.4.2.1 Integration with RW. As part of the process under agreements between EM and RW, RW
has committed to identify acceptance criteria. The NSNFP supported RW’s efforts in developing
performance-based acceptance criteria. By developing a risk-informed strategy, the NSNFP was able to 
eliminate reliance on the waste form and the characterization requirements that have no basis in law, safe 
conduct of operations, or long-term performance. The acceptance of DOE SNF is not expected to require 
extensive measurement and remediation. Therefore, in most cases, the requirements are focused on SSCs 
important to safety and waste isolation. 
2.4.2.2 Integration with EM Sites. Site compliance plans describe how a specific EM site will 
demonstrate compliance with each requirement in the RW acceptance criteria. These documents include 
descriptions of the tests, analyses, and process controls to be performed by EM, including the 
identification of records to be provided to demonstrate compliance with the specifications. The NSNFP
coordinated the preparation of these plans and evaluated their adequacy.
2.4.2.3 Safeguards. From 1998 through 2004, EM and RW examined safeguards and security
issues related to the disposal of DOE SNF. The RW approach to implementing safeguards and security at 
the MGR is based on:
…a demonstration that candidate materials are no more attractive from a theft standpoint than
commercial spent nuclear fuel or vitrified HLW and, thus, are adequately protected.
From a licensing perspective, four characteristics are important to demonstrating the 
unattractiveness of a candidate material from the standpoint of theft:
x Size, including overall weight 
x Fissile material content
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x Relative difficulty of separation 
x Homogeneity and concentration of special nuclear material content.20
The NSNFP applied these characteristics to DOE SNF to determine the relative attractiveness of DOE 
SNF relative to commercial SNF. An initial screening task used an expert elicitation process to examine
the last two characteristics i.e., relative difficulty of separation, and homogeneity and concentration. This
produced a fuel specific determination of difficulty of separation relative to commercial SNF. Subsequent 
to this, the NSNFP participated in a second expert elicitation workshop where overall attractiveness was 
determined based on size, fissile mass, and ease of separation. It was concluded that DOE SNF when 
packaged in large sealed canisters, such as DOE standard canisters, is no more attractive for theft than 
commercial SNF.
2.4.2.4 Multi-Detector Analysis System. In 1997, the NSNFP began research and development on
a technology to characterize SNF for fissile mass, radiation source term, and fissile isotopic content. This
work was performed to provide confirmatory data for some DOE SNF types. The NSNFP began to 
investigate a method to directly measure properties of SNF. The Multi-Detector Analysis System integrated
a large detector array, fast electronics, high-speed data acquisition, real-time analysis, and archival mass
storage methods to characterize SNF and remote-handled transuranic waste without special calibration
standards or a priori knowledge.
Although the prototype system was successfully used to identify spontaneous fission in natural
sources, the Multi-Detector Analysis System research was discontinued in 2001. This decision was based 
on signal source strength, mobility, and signal to noise ratio issues that made the system impractical for 
systematic SNF analysis. In addition, the NSNFP licensing strategy was evolving to rely on the robust 
containment properties of the DOE standard canister. Therefore, detailed fuel-specific characterization
was determined to be unnecessary for repository waste acceptance.
2.4.3 Transportation System
In 1994, the NSNFP began development of a transportation system for the safe, efficient, 
shipment of DOE SNF. The transportation system was being developed according to 10 CFR Part 71 
transportation system requirements to be licensed by the NRC. The NSNFP developed this system to 
accommodate the wide variety of DOE SNF types. A cask system was being developed with nine 
interchangeable basket configurations to allow for custom fuel shipments that met the needs of each DOE
SNF site. The system would minimize cask-handling operations and personnel exposure, and it would 
reduce load and transfer times. 
In 2001, DOE consolidated the responsibility for SNF transportation within RW, and work on
this effort was discontinued by the NSNFP. RW is currently in the process of establishing a contract for 
the transportation of all SNF, both commercial and DOE SNF, to the repository. At the request of RW, 
some of the NSNFP development work is being provided for their use.
2.5 The NSNFP Today
By completing the work described above, the NSNFP has developed an understanding of what is 
important in terms of preparing the DOE SNF for final MGR disposal and interim storage. Today, the 
NSNFP continues to work with the EM sites to effectively manage and package DOE SNF for interim
management. For long-term success, the NSNFP has identified a number of program elements that will 
ensure the final MGR disposition of all DOE SNF. The first program element is to ensure a 
well-developed DOE SNF licensing strategy that includes all DOE SNF. The second element is to 
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complete all necessary DOE SNF analyses needed to support the final repository license application. The 
third element is to provide licensing application/request for additional information support, transportation,
and waste acceptance support to ensure DOE SNF is included in the initial “receive and possess” license 
amendment and that DOE SNF is transportable using the final RW cask design. Section 3 provides 
additional details on the DOE SNF licensing strategy. The appendixes discuss the analyses supporting the 
DOE SNF licensing strategy. 
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3. DOE SNF LICENSING STRATEGY
At the March 2002 quarterly meeting between the RW and the EM, the RW management and 
operations contractor and the NSNFP were directed to reach consensus on the technical bases and
approach for including DOE SNF in the license application. Consensus was reached through a series of 
interactions held between June and August 2002.21 These interactions addressed preclosure safety,
criticality safety, and postclosure performance assessment. As the repository design matures, the DOE 
SNF licensing strategy may be updated as needed to ensure all DOE SNF destined for direct disposition is 
accepted in the MGR. 
In accordance with the NRC regulation, this licensing strategy uses a risk-informed, 
performance-based decision-making process to identify SSCs that are important-to-safety and waste
isolation. Additional measures are also considered and included, as necessary, to provide 
defense-in-depth. This section is an overview of the licensing strategy for DOE SNF in the 
repository-licensing basis. 
Risk is a couplet involving both likelihood and consequences. Therefore, each safety function has 
both preventive and mitigative elements. Prevention is preferable to mitigation because it results in the 
elimination of the risk rather than merely reduction of undesirable consequences. The safety case
diagram, Figure 3-1, has separate branches for the preclosure and postclosure program phases. For each 
safety function, there is at least one preventive and one mitigative control strategy. For each control 
strategy, there is one or more SSC and barriers. SSCs and barriers are shaded in Figure 3-1 to highlight
those that are the primary focus of this strategy. The SSCs and barriers in darker shading are important to 
safety or important to waste isolation, and the SSCs and barriers in lighter shading are considered to be 
additional measures.
The analyses used to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 63.111(b) and 10 CFR 63.113(b) will
only credit SSCs and barriers that are important to safety or important to waste isolation. The NSNFP’s 
objective is to have the DOE SNF analyzed in the license application such that no fuel will be rejected. 
3.1 Preclosure Strategy
For preclosure safety, the maximum allowable radiological consequences for an event (or 
sequence of events) is based on the estimated frequency of occurrence. Category 1 event sequence is a 
series of actions and/or occurrences that are expected to occur one or more times before permanent
closure of the geologic repository operations area that could potentially lead to exposure of individuals to
radiation. Category 2 event sequence is a series of actions and/or occurrences that have at least one
chance in 10,000 of occurring before permanent closure. Beyond Category 2 event sequence is a series of 
actions and/or occurrences that have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring before permanent 
closure. The maximum allowable consequences for the Category 1 and Category 2 events are specified in 
10 CFR part 63.111. There are no requirements for Beyond Category 2 events. 
The key to the preclosure strategy for both radionuclide confinement and criticality control is the
DOE standard canisters and their ability to maintain confinement under credible conditions and 
accidents.23 As long as the DOE standard canisters maintain confinement, there will be no radionuclide
release, and there can be no criticality. Many of the NSNFP activities have focused on demonstrating the 
reliability of the DOE standard canisters. This strategy has minimal reliance on fuel-specific DOE SNF 
characterization information. Existing DOE SNF information is sufficient for facility design of the 
shielding and ventilation systems and for Beyond Category 2 analyses. Even in the highly unlikely event
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the DOE standard canister breaches,d any releases would be expected to be well below allowable limits
based on retention within the DOE standard canister, credit for cladding or fuel matrix, etc. 
The MGR facilities will be designed to provide gamma and neutron radiation shielding as 
required for worker protection. Because there is nothing unique about the DOE SNF that requires special 
radiation protection measures, a strategy for radiation protection specific to DOE SNF is not needed, and 
this safety function is not addressed further. 
3.2 Postclosure Strategy
The DOE SNF postclosure licensing strategy, which is the same as for the commercial SNF, 
relies on the combination of engineered and natural barriers to meet performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.113(b). As part of the design process, RW has identified specific SSCs as being important to 
waste isolation. These SSCs either prevent or substantially reduce movement of water or prevent or 
substantially reduce releases of radionuclides from the waste. These barriers work in concert with one 
another to ensure the regulatory objectives are met. For example, the drip shield would remain intact 
beyond the regulatory period and prevent groundwater from dripping onto the waste packages, thereby
limiting transport to diffusion even if a waste package was to fail. 
Reasonable values and approaches will be used in evaluating the postclosure safety aspects to 
allow an expected or “realistic” value to be determined. Simple, bounding evaluations will be used when 
this approach does not overly constrain the design or the operations of the facility. To represent individual 
DOE SNF waste packages in the licensing bases, DOE’s intention is to use bounding analyses to 
demonstrate that the performance objectives cannot be exceeded in the event DOE SNF waste packages
were to fail during the regulatory time period. DOE SNF information related to total key radionuclides
(see Reference 6) and a reasonable range of total number of canisters24 will be used to represent DOE 
SNF in the nominal base case.
For DOE SNF, an instantaneous release rate will be used with nominal radionuclide inventory to
show DOE SNF is still well below limits. This instantaneous release model is conservative because the 
DOE standard canister, cladding, and realistic degradation rates would delay the release. However, these 
are not credited in the licensing bases.
3.3 DOE SNF Licensing Strategy Summary
This strategy places primary reliance on SSCs and barriers, mainly the DOE standard canisters
and the engineered and natural barriers. This strategy places minimal reliance on additional DOE SNF 
characterization. In addition to demonstrating compliance with regulatory limits, the strategy provides 
additional measures consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy. Analyses and testing described in 
the appendixes support this strategy.
d. An opening in a transportation cask, spent nuclear fuel canister, disposal canister, waste package, or drip shield caused by
corrosion or mechanical stress.
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4. QUALITY ASSURANCE
This document was developed and is controlled in accordance with NSNFP procedures. Unless
noted otherwise, information must be evaluated for adequacy relative to its specific use if relied on to 
support design or decisions important to safety or waste isolation. 
The NSNFP procedures applied to this activity implement DOE/RW-0333P, Quality Assurance 
Requirements and Description, and are part of the NSNFP QA Program. The NSNFP QA Program has
been assessed and accepted by representatives of the Office of Quality Assurance within the Office of 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management for the work scope of the NSNFP. The NSNFP work scope 
extends to the work represented in this report. 
The current, principal NSNFP procedures applied to this activity include the following:
x NSNFP Program Management Procedure (PMP) 6.01, “Review and Approval of NSNFP Internal 
Documents”
x NSNFP PMP 6.03, “Managing Document Control and Distribution”
x NSNFP Program Support Organization (PSO) 3.04, “Engineering Documentation.”
DOE/SNF/REP-091 September 2004
Revision 0 Page 33 of 36
5. COMPUTER CODE/SOFTWARE
Microsoft® WORD and EXCEL 2000 SR1 programs loaded on a DELL OptiPlex GX260 were
used to generate this report and various tables in this report. No other computer software was used in the 
preparation of this report. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This report covers the technical activities of the NSNFP in support of the licensing process. Since 
the inception of the NSNFP, the proposed MGR has moved from viability assessment (determine its 
viability as a repository), through site recommendation (the study of its adequacy to be recommended by
the Secretary of DOE as a repository site), to the current preparation of a license application. During this 
period, the NRC has promulgated the new regulation 10 CFR 63 for the MGR to protect the public and 
the environment.
The NSNFP has refined and adjusted its technical activities within an evolving regulatory
environment to ensure that DOE SNF continues to be part of these licensing processes. The DOE SNF 
was included as part of the repository waste form when DOE SNF was included in the 1998 RW baseline. 
The DOE SNF was included in the viability assessment in 1998 and the site recommendation in 2001. 
And the DOE SNF will be included in the license application planned in December 2004. The DOE SNF 
licensing strategy defines the acceptance path for DOE SNF. 
The NSNFP will continue to evaluate the needs of the repository program and work with the sites
to ensure the proper technical activities are completed so that all DOE SNF planned for direct disposition 
is accepted into the repository.
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Appendix A 
Preclosure Safety Activities 
For preclosure safety, 10 CFR Part 63.111 implements a risk-informed approach to safety by 
establishing maximum allowable radiological consequences for an event (or sequence of events) based on 
its estimated frequency of occurrence. The risk thresholds established by 10 CFR Part 63.111 are 
summarized in Table A-1. 
This regulatory framework acknowledges that risks may be addressed by preventing the 
occurrence of events, by mitigating their consequence, or both. For the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF), other than those that will be handled and disposed of as commercial SNF, the 
strategy for demonstrating compliance with preclosure safety requirements relies on prevention. 
Radiological releases from DOE SNF are prevented by reliance on DOE standard canistersa to contain 
DOE SNF during credible accident scenarios. Reasons for selecting a preclosure licensing strategy based 
on prevention include: 
x Minimization of the need for qualified fuel-specific data—Relying on a sealed canister as an 
engineered barrier will provide confinement during credible preclosure events, thereby reducing 
the need for fuel-specific information and avoiding the costs and radiological exposures 
associated with fuel characterization activities. 
x Compliance with ALARA principles—In addition to avoiding the personnel exposure associated 
with fuel characterization activities needed for qualifying fuel-specific data to support dose 
calculations, reliance on an engineered barrier eliminates doses associated with radiological 
releases that may accompany unplanned events. 
x Standardization—DOE SNF includes a broad range of fuel configurations that have been handled 
and stored at various DOE facilities for several decades. Because of the diverse configurations 
and storage history of this SNF, standard canisters are needed to simplify equipment interfaces 
needed for handling and transportation. 
x Simplification of analyses and controls—Reliance on an engineered barrier designed and tested to 
current standards eliminates the analytical and administrative burden associated with licensing, 
certifying, and accepting several hundred different fuel configurations.  
The key to the preclosure strategy for both radionuclide confinement and criticality control is the 
DOE standard canister and its ability to maintain confinement under credible conditions and accidents.1
The strategy for radionuclide confinement relies on the fact that all DOE SNF is shipped in DOE standard 
canisters that will preclude any radiological release for all Category 1 and 2 events. Table A-2 identifies 
the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) and barriers for this strategy. Many National Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) activities have focused on demonstrating the reliability of the DOE 
standard canister. This strategy has minimal reliance on fuel-specific DOE SNF characterization 
information. Existing DOE SNF information is sufficient for facility design of the shielding and 
ventilation systems and for Beyond Category 2 analyses. Even in the highly unlikely event that the DOE 
standard canister breaches, Beyond Category 2 analyses have shown that any release would be expected 
to be well below allowable limits. However, Beyond Category 2 analysis will not be part of the licensing 
bases.
                                                     
a. The term DOE standard canister refers to both the DOE standardized canister and the multi-canister overpack. 
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Table A-1. Preclosure regulatory criteria. 
Probability of 
Occurrence during 
Repository Preclosure 
Period (P) 
Annual Frequency of 
Occurrencea (PA) Event Category 
Maximum Allowable 
Consequence 
P>1 PA > 1E-2/yr 1 Occupational dose limits per 
10 CFR 20 
1E-4<P<1 1E-6/yr > PA < 1E-2/yr 2 5 Rem (TEDE) 
or
15 Rem (lens of eye) 
or
50 Rem (DDE+CDE to any organ 
except lens of eye) 
or
50 Rem (SDE) 
P<1E-4 PA<1E-6/yr Beyond Category 2  No requirements specified  
CDE = committed dose equivalent 
DDE = deep dose equivalent 
SDE = skin dose equivalent 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
a. The annual frequency of occurrence was computed by uniformly distributing the allowable occurrences over a 100-year period. 
Table A-2. Systems, structures, and components for preclosure radionuclide confinement. 
SSC and Barrier Category Description 
DOE standard 
canisters (DOE SCs) 
Important to safety For DOE SCs transfer operations in the Canister Transfer 
System, the DOE SC will be designed and demonstrated to 
provide total containment under all credible conditions and 
events including the maximum credible drop. 
Canister handling 
system and 
associated facility 
Important to safety The canister handling system and facility design (bridge crane, 
lifting fixtures, etc.) will both minimize the likelihood of DOE 
SC drops as well as minimize the height of a potential drop. 
DOE SNF cladding 
and fuel matrix 
Potential additional 
measures but no 
credits taken in the 
license application at 
this time 
The cladding and matrix will provide partial confinement in the 
extremely unlikely event of a DOE SC breach. The extent of 
confinement varies across the fuel types. 
Standard canisters 
(SCs)
Additional measure Though important to safety with respect to ensuring that a 
breach is beyond Beyond Category 2, the DOE SC will also 
mitigate radiological consequences by retaining much of its 
contents in the extremely unlikely event of a drop and breach. 
Canister Handling 
Facility (CHF) 
confinement system 
Additional measure The CHF confinement system will mitigate any release that may 
occur within the CHF. The mitigation includes settling, plate 
out, and HEPA filtration. 
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Because the strategy does not rely on DOE SNF characteristics to demonstrate compliance with 
10 CFR Part 63.111(b), no additional characterization will be required. The only DOE SNF requirement 
will be that DOE SNF be shipped in DOE standard canisters. 
Section A-1 summarizes the NSNFP activities and products that provide the technical 
justification for the licensing strategy based on preventing a breach of a canister containing DOE SNF. 
An unplanned radiological release from canisters containing DOE SNF can be prevented by relying on 
engineered solutions that minimize challenges to the canister integrity (i.e., a drop) and preventing a 
canister breach in the event of a challenge. Implementation of this strategy for prevention of a drop and 
breach renders any preclosure event not to be credible.  
Section A-2 provides an overview of NSNFP activities and information that support Beyond 
Category 2 consequence analyses. Although not directly relied on to support the licensing case, 
consequence analyses have nonetheless been performed for a breach, even though not credible. These 
Beyond Category 2 analyses quantify the available safety margin and provide additional insights into the 
risks associated with receiving and handling DOE SNF. 
A-1. DOE SNF LICENSING CASE
PREVENTION OF RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE 
A-1.1 Performance Allocation 
Personnel at Yucca Mountain evaluated 27 design alternatives intended to reduce the risk 
associated with handling DOE standard canisters.2 The evaluation focused on minimizing the possibility 
of breaching a canister, preventing and mitigating the design basis events, developing alternative handling 
concepts, considering cost and reliability issues, and other risks associated with system designs. The study 
concluded that the design alternatives that eliminate drop events exceeding the design bases of the 
canisters minimize the risk to workers, the public, and facility operations. 
Because of the many design alternatives capable of preventing canister breach and the resultant 
benefits, system level requirements to preclude breach of a DOE standard canister were recommended. 
Additional trade studies were performed and documented in Reference 3. Eight specific facility design 
alternatives were evaluated. Four were eliminated based on cost/benefit considerations. Two of the 
remaining four were considered to be outside the control of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
System program and were thus not considered viable scenarios to pursue. The remaining two alternatives 
were used to develop and recommend specific design criteria by allocating performance to the canister 
and canister handling systems.  
Two additional activities demonstrated that facility and equipment design, coupled with canister 
reliability, could be successfully relied on to reduce the likelihood of a canister breach during the 
preclosure period to below the Beyond Category 2 threshold (i.e., <1E-4). The NSNFP estimated the 
canister critical flaw size and the likelihood of a flaw equal to or greater than the critical flaw size to go 
undetected during the fabrication and canister acceptance process.4 The Yucca Mountain Project 
evaluated a range of canister and Canister Transfer System performance failure probabilities to determine 
their effect on the frequency of a radionuclide release.5 The evaluation focused on a particular initiating 
event—a drop of a canister due to failure of a Canister Transfer System bridge crane, which was 
determined to be the bounding event for the Canister Transfer System. These evaluations confirmed that 
reasonably achievable performance requirements for the Canister Transfer System and DOE standard 
canisters could reduce the likelihood of a release to below the Beyond Category 2 threshold. 
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Based on the results of these activities, the recommended design criteria for the DOE standard 
canisters were translated into the Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD).6 The 
WASRD requires all DOE SNF that cannot be handled interchangeably with standard commercial 
pressurized water reactor or boiling water reactor fuels to be placed in DOE standard canisters. Other 
DOE standard canister requirements are specified including survivability requirements that, when coupled 
with the design controls imposed on canister handling equipment, will ensure that 10 CFR Part 63 limits 
are satisfied. The WASRD requirements, as written, allow canister acceptance based either on 
certification that a given dose would not be exceeded if breached or on certification that the probability of 
canister breach is Beyond Category 2. 
These WASRD requirements essentially establish the design requirements for repository canister 
handling equipment and the survivability requirements for DOE standard canisters. Yucca Mountain 
Project canister handling system designs must ensure that the specified drops are not exceeded. And the 
DOE standard canister design must ensure that the likelihood of a breach, if dropped from within these 
limits, is sufficiently small that, when coupled with the likelihood of a drop, the combined probability 
renders the event not credible (i.e., Beyond Category 2). 
A-1.2 DOE Standard Canister Design and Testing 
In 1997, the NSNFP began the development of the DOE standardized canister concept. The 
objective was to have a canister into which DOE SNF would be placed and never reopened. The canister 
would be:
x Used within a facility (probably HEPA-filtered) when handled by itself 
x Placed within a storage facility or cask during interim storage
x Placed within a transportation package for movement to the national repository
x Ultimately loaded inside a waste package at the repository for permanent disposal. 
Canister requirements were based on preliminary waste acceptance criteria for the proposed 
repository. They included normal operating conditions (e.g., heat generation rates, internal pressure) and 
off-normal event conditions, which included. an accidental drop during canister handling. It was 
recognized early that for repository-defined normal operating conditions, the canister could be shown to 
meet the criteria of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel 
(B&PV) Code7 due to its robust design. Additional analyses and testing have been performed by the 
NSNFP in order to demonstrate canister integrity under all credible scenarios during repository preclosure 
operations. This assumption was further refined during development of the licensing strategy for DOE 
SNF when the robustness of the standard canister was demonstrated. The licensing approach relies on the 
low probability of failure of the DOE standard canister during surface facility operations. Although 
conditions during interim storage and transportation are not completely known, based on industry 
experience, it is assumed that the canister can be designed to ensure repository performance objectives 
will not be compromised by storage and age-related degradation. 
In a drop event, the material stresses were expected to exceed the ASME Level D stress limits. It 
was also expected that the canister components made of ductile materials (e.g., stainless steel) could 
experience significant plastic deformation before rupture would occur. During 1998 and 1999, the 
NSNFP performed a number of drop tests of test specimens and canisters to show that the DOE 
standardized canister could maintain containment during a variety of accidental drop events. These tests 
were also used to validate the use of finite element analytical methods in predicting canister response 
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during drop events and to calculate the material deformations and strains. The following sections will 
show that considerable plastic straining of the canister stainless steel components occurred without a 
single breach during the testing. These sections also provide: 
x A background on the development of the DOE standard canister concept 
x A general description of the DOE standardized canister design configuration, the ASME 
calculation performed on the DOE standardized canister under drop conditions 
x A discussion on the drop testing of small and full-scale 304L stainless steel specimens performed 
in 1998 
x A summarization of results of the drop testing of nine DOE standardized test canisters under a 
variety of drop conditions 
x A summary of what these results mean 
x An overview of the current status of the DOE standardized canister and multi-canister overpack 
(MCO) development activities. 
A-1.2.1 Background of the Development of DOE Standard Canisters 
In November and December 1995, a working group was established to develop a path forward for 
dispositioning DOE SNF at the Savannah River Site. During subsequent discussions, which included 
technical staffs from the three major DOE sites (Hanford, the Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory [INEEL], Savannah River Site), DOE-Office of Environmental Management 
(EM) Headquarters staff, and the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Office (YMSCO), a proposed DOE 
high-level waste (HLW) waste package was presented to the participants. This waste package was shown 
with five 24-in.-diameter HLW canisters clustered in a circle, with an open space in the middle. The 
working group proposed that DOE SNF could be disposed in the center location with little added cost. This 
configuration would also facilitate criticality safety. NSNFP and EM management recognized the potential 
for reducing the EM disposal costs and reducing handling costs at both the DOE sites and the repository. In 
a video conference held on January 23, 1996, DOE and contractor participants discussed the formation of a 
Standard Canister Working Group. A charter and mission statement for this group was discussed, and a 
kickoff meeting was organized. 
The first Working Group meeting was held on April 14, 1996, in Atlanta, Georgia. INEEL, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, and YMSCO representatives presented their proposed plans for packaging 
DOE SNF for disposal. The YMSCO presentation was particularly significant because it identified a 
canister that was proposed for placement of DOE SNF in the center position of the HLW waste package 
as had been discussed at the January 23 video conference (see Figure A-1). The available space was a 
little over 17 in. in diameter and either 120 or 180 in. long. For the remainder of 1996, the concept of 
codisposal of DOE SNF with HLW was refined, and initial total system performance assessment and 
criticality analyses were performed. No identifiable issues were raised and subsequently in 
February 1997, the NSNFP formally initiated a DOE standardized canister development work task.  
In 1998, the NSNFP worked with the YMSCO staff to increase the waste package diameter 
slightly to allow the use of standard 18-in. diameter pipe for the DOE standardized canister. A large 
diameter (24-in.) standardized canister was not an issue because it was the same diameter as the HLW 
canister. A study was conducted that concluded all DOE SNF could be disposed in either the 18-in. or 
24-in.-diameter DOE standardized canister having either 10 or 15-ft lengths. The proposed DOE SNF 
canister design has been baselined in the repository program and has been used in all analyses including  
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Figure A-1. DOE HLW/DOE SNF waste package.
the final environmental impact statement and site recommendation. Currently, the INEEL, Savannah 
River Site, and Hanford (except for fuels to be placed in MCOs) have all indicated their intent to use DOE 
standardized canisters for packaging of their SNF for disposal. Moreover, Argonne National Laboratory
has plans to use the DOE standardized canister for packaging the HLW from their electrometallurgical
treatment process. The decision to use the DOE standardized canister will limit the handling procedures
and handling tools required at the repository for all DOE SNF types.
In parallel, Hanford was developing a MCO to repackage N-reactor fuel and move it from
water-filled basins near the Columbia River to a dry storage facility. The MCO was initially designed for 
interim storage to satisfy a near-term need to move the N-reactor fuel. The NSNFP performed an early
review of the MCO and determined that a minor change to the design of the MCO internal baskets would 
increase the probability that it could be transported in a horizontal configuration to the repository at a later 
date. The NSNFP has demonstrated that the MCO can meet the operational loads and the identified 
accidental drops at the repository surface facility and will be analyzing the MCO for transportation loads 
in the near future. 
A-1.2.2 DOE Standardized Canister Design 
The DOE standardized canister design resulted in four unique sizes.
1. 18-in. (457-mm) diameter, 3/8-in. (9.53-mm)-thick walls, 10-ft (3.05-m) total length, 5,005-lb
(2,270-kg) total weight 
2. 18-in. (457-mm) diameter, 3/8-in. (9.53-mm)-thick walls, 15-ft (4.57-m) total length, 6,000-lb
(2,722-kg) total weight 
3. 24-in. (610-mm) diameter, 1/2-in. (12.7-mm)-thick walls, 10-ft (3.05-m) total length, 8,996-lb
(4,081-kg) total weight 
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4. 24-in. (610-mm) diameter, 1/2-in. (12.7-mm)-thick walls, 15-ft (4.57-m) total length, 10,000-lb
(4,536-kg) total weight. 
A skirt with a lifting ring is attached to each canister end. Canister shells, dished heads, skirts, 
and lifting rings are made of either SA-312 or SA-240 316L stainless steel. Figures A-2 and A-3 show 
this design for the 18-in. (457-mm)-diameter canister.
Contents
Drop Resistant End
(head, skirt, and ring)
Canister
Main Body
Impact Plate
Drop Resistant End
(head, skirt, ring, and
impact plate)
Wall
3/8-Inch (9.53-mm) Thick
316L SA-312
Impact Plate
2-Inch (50.8-mm) Thick
CS A-36
Flanged Head
3/8-Inch (9.53-mm) Thick
316L SA-240
Skirt
3/8-Inch (9.53-mm) Thick
316L SA-312
Lifting Ring
1-Inch (25.4-mm) Wide
1/2-Inch (12.7-mm) Thick
316L SA-240
Figure A-2. DOE standardized canister overall 
design (section view). 
Figure A-3. 18-in. (457-mm) canister lower end 
(section view). 
A-1.2.3 ASME Code Calculations—Allowable Drop Height 
Drop analyses of a capacity-loaded 18-in. (457-mm)-diameter, 15-ft (4.57-m)-long, DOE 
standardized canister were performed to determine the maximum height that the canister could be 
dropped under the most unfavorable orientation such that the containment boundary would meet the 
requirements of the ASME B&PV Code, Section III. These analyses were detailed in an internal memo.8
First, the allowable stress levels from the ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Appendix F, “Rules for
Evaluation of Service Loadings with Level D Service Limits,” (see Reference 7) were determined. The general
primary membrane stress intensity limit for the canister material (316L stainless steel) was 44.8 ksi (309 MPa),
and the maximum primary membrane plus bending stress intensity limit was 57.6 ksi (397 MPa).
Next, the worst-case drop angle was determined to be 10 degrees off horizontal (canister 
impacting a rigid flat surface). At this orientation, the DOE standardized canister would first impact the 
bottom end, then rotate to “slap down” the top end. A finite element model was used to calculate the 
stresses in the canister starting with a 10-ft (3.05-m) drop. The resulting stresses did not meet the 
acceptance criteria, so successive runs were conducted until a 1-ft (0.3-m) drop height case was reached.
At this point, the acceptance criteria were met for the bottom-end impact, but were still exceeded for the 
subsequent top-end slapdown. Specifically, the average stress across eight equally spaced sections
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through the thickness was 49.8 ksi (343 MPa) (greater than the 44.8 ksi [309 MPa] allowed) with an outer 
surface peak of 67.7 ksi (467 MPa) (greater than the 57.6 ksi [397 MPa] allowed), occurring in the top 
head at the knuckle. (Because the drop event is a rapidly occurring dynamic event, these stress levels 
occurred for only a few milliseconds.) 
It was concluded that the ASME Code methodology of stress limits inadequately addressed 
canister accidental drop events. This was not surprising because the ASME Code methodology is based 
on situations where pressure, mechanical, or thermal loads are applied in a static or slowly varying 
multiple-second timeframe, and not on dynamic impact cases where the loads are applied for a few 
milliseconds and then never repeated. Drop events are better defined by strains. 
A-1.2.4 Summary of 1998 Testing of Small and Full-Sized Standardized Canister 
Specimens
Eleven test specimens were drop tested in 1998 by the NSNFP at the INEEL. These drop tests are 
summarized in an INEEL letter report (see Reference 8). 
A-1.2.4.1 5-Inch-Diameter Drop Test Specimens 
Six 5-in. (127-mm)-diameter test specimens were constructed using approximately 3-ft 
(0.91-m)-long, thin walled tubes. A flat plate was welded in the top and bottom of each tube to represent 
heads. A relatively thick interior plate was welded 3 in. (76.2 mm) from the bottom head to support the 
contents, which consisted of lengths of No. 4 rebar. All specimen materials, excluding the interior rebar, 
were 304L stainless steel. The weight of each test specimen was just over 110 lb (50 kg). These test 
specimens were initially oriented at 15 degrees off vertical, and were dropped at heights of 10 ft (3.05 m), 
15 ft (4.57 m, 2 specimens), 20 ft (6.10m), 25 ft (7.62 m), and 30 ft (9.14 m) onto a “rigid” surface (2-in. 
[50.8-mm] steel plate on a thick concrete pad). The test and analytical results are summarized as follows: 
x The specimen damage was confined to the volume between the bottom head and the contents 
support plate. The bulk of the deformation occurred in the tube wall as a single outward bulge. 
x Finite element models (using ABAQUS/Explicit Version 5.8-1) predicted the deformed shape of the 
dropped specimens very well. The calculated peak equivalent plastic strain levels increased with 
drop height, reaching a maximum of 86% on a surface and 26% at mid-thickness (giving an average 
of about 50% through the wall) on the highest drop. Pressure testing of all specimens after drop 
testing indicated that the pressure boundary had been maintained (25 psig [172 kPa] pressure was 
held steady for 1 hour without loss). 
x A comparison of drop height versus resulting equivalent plastic strains in the test specimens 
showed that large increases in drop height (5-ft [1.52-m] increments) corresponded to small 
increases in material strains (about 10% peak strain per increment). Figure A-4 illustrates the 
strain results of the 5-in. (127-mm)-diameter drop tests versus drop height. 
A-1.2.4.2 18-Inch-Diameter Short Drop Test Specimen—One 18-in. (457-mm)-diameter short 
test specimen was constructed using a 5-ft (1.52-m)-long thin wall tube. A flat plate was welded to the 
tube top to form the top head. An 18-in. (457-mm)-radius shallow head was inserted 7 in. (177.8 mm) 
into the bottom of the tube and welded in place. The contents consisted of No. 4 rebar and a lightweight 
interior structure. All specimen materials, excluding the contents, were 304L stainless steel. The total 
weight of the specimen was about 1,000 lb (453.6 kg). This specimen was oriented at 32 degrees 
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Figure A-4. 5-in. (127-mm) specimens, peak plastic strain versus drop height.
off-vertical at impact and was dropped from a height of 30 ft (9.14 m) onto a “rigid” surface (a 2-in. 
[50.8-mm] steel plate on a thick concrete pad). The test and analytical results are summarized as follows: 
x The most significant specimen damage was confined to the skirt as expected. The skirt folded 
inward toward the lower head, bending the skirt walls. 
x A finite element model of the specimen predicted the deformed shape very well. The peak 
equivalent plastic strain in the pressure boundary was calculated in the model at 13% on a surface
and 3% at mid-thickness (giving an average of about 7% through the wall). Post-drop pressure
testing showed that the pressure boundary had been maintained (25 psig [172 kPa] and held 
steady for 1 hour without loss). 
A-1.2.4.3 Representative Drop Test Specimens—Two full-scale representative drop test 
specimens were constructed of 304L stainless steel, an 18-in. (457-mm)-diameter and a 24-in. (610-mm)
diameter canister, both 15 ft (4.57 m) in total length. The contents of the representative test specimens
consisted of rebar, steel sections filled with concrete, etc. The total loaded weight of the 18-in. (457-mm)
test specimen was 5,690 lb (2,581 kg), while the 24-in. (610-mm) test specimen was 9,790 lb (4,441 kg).
Each test specimen was oriented such that the center-of-gravity was over the impacting corner (6 degrees 
off-vertical for the 18-in. [457-mm] test specimen, 9 degrees off-vertical for the 24-in. [610-mm] test 
specimen) and dropped from a height of 30 ft (9.14-m) onto a “rigid” surface (a 2-in. [50.8-mm] steel
plate on a thick concrete pad). The test and analytical results are summarized as follows:
x The visual damage to the representative test specimens was limited to the lifting rings and skirts 
on the impacting end of each specimen as expected. 
x Pre- and postdrop test finite element models showed a good match in overall deformation shape 
to the actual dropped test specimens. The peak equivalent plastic strain in the pressure boundary
of the 18-in. (457-mm) test specimen was calculated in the model at 3% on a surface and 1% at
mid-thickness; giving an average of about 2% through the wall. The 24-in. (610-mm) test 
specimen had 4% on a surface and 1% at mid-thickness, giving an average of about 2% through 
the wall. Postdrop pressure testing showed that the pressure boundary had been maintained.
DOE/SNF/REP-091 September 2004
Revision 0 Page A-12 of A-24
After the 18-in. (457-mm) test specimen was dropped at 6 degrees off-vertical, it was dropped 
30 ft (9.14 m) again in a horizontal orientation. A postdrop pressure test showed that the pressure 
boundary was still maintained. 
A-1.2.4.4 Puncture Drop Tests—Following the drop tests of the 18-in. (457-mm) and 24-in. 
(610-mm)-diameter representative drop test specimens discussed in the previous section and the 
subsequent pressure tests, these two test specimens were subjected to a drop onto a puncture bar. With the 
test specimen in a horizontal orientation, the puncture testing consisted of a 40-in. (1-m) drop through the 
air onto a 6-in. (152.5-mm)-diameter, 12-in. (304.8-mm)-tall, solid steel bar. The puncture bar was 
welded to a flat-horizontal, 2-in. (50.8-mm) thick, steel plate placed on a concrete pad. The test specimens 
were modified by removing the impacted end (from the previous drop tests) so that contents could be 
arranged to provide an empty volume where the puncture post would impact. The specimen end was not 
reattached for this test. The 18-in. (457-mm)-diameter test specimen weighed 5,775 lb (2,620 kg), and the 
24-in. (610-mm)-diameter test specimen weighed 9,820 lb (4,454 kg) for this puncture drop test. 
Additional weights were added to the test specimens. The test and analytical results are summarized as 
follows:
x The results showed that the two test specimens did experience significant deformation from 
impact with the puncture post. 
x The finite element models showed a good match in deformation shape to the test specimens after 
impacting the puncture bar. The peak equivalent plastic strain in the pressure boundary of the 
18-in. (457-mm) test specimen was calculated in the model at 24% on a surface and 6% at 
mid-thickness, giving an average of about 14% through the wall, while the 24-in. (610-mm) test 
specimen had 15% on a surface and 7% at mid-thickness, giving an average of about 10% 
through the wall. 
Because the test specimens’ lower ends were removed after the previous drop testing, no pressure 
testing after the puncture drop was possible. However, visual examinations clearly indicated that there 
was no significant damage to the pressure retention capability of either test specimen. 
A-1.2.4.5 Conclusions to 1998 Testing—The drop testing and finite element analyses on the 
5-in. (127-mm) diameter specimens, the 18-in. (457-mm) diameter short specimen, and the 18-in. 
(457-mm) and 24-in. (610-mm) representative test specimens showed two important things. First, all the 
test specimens retained their pressure boundary after the drop testing even though the calculated material 
strains were higher than allowed by the ASME B&PV Code. Second, finite element methods using plastic 
analyses could accurately calculate the deformed shape of each test specimen.
A-1.2.5 Summary of 1999 Testing of Nine Representative Test Standardized Canisters 
Nine representative test canisters (all 18-in. [457-mm] diameters) were drop tested in 1999 by the 
NSNFP at Sandia National Laboratories. These drop tests are summarized in an NSNFP report (see 
Reference 1). 
All the representative test canister pressure boundary components (body and heads), skirts, and 
lifting rings were made of 316L stainless steel. A summary of the test canister configurations and 
intended impact orientations is given in Table A-3. 
Figures A-5 and A-6 show the configuration of internal components in these representative test 
canisters.
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Table A-3. Representative test canister configurations and orientations.
Canister No. 
Length
(ft)
Desired Impact Angle 
Off-Vertical
(degrees)
Total Weight
(lb)
Drop Height 
(ft) Contentsa
18-15-00-01 15 0 6033 30 S, S-W
18-15-06-02 15 6b 5948 30 S, S-W
18-15-90-03 15 90 5995 30 S, S-W
18-15-45-04 15 45 5995 30 S, S-W
18-15-80-05 15 80 5965 30 S, S-W
18-10-90-06 10 90 3802 30 HICs
18-10-90-07 10 90 2997 30 Shippingport
18-15-PW-08 15 0 5972 2 S-W
18-15-PP-09 15 90 6085 40 in. S-W
1 ft = 0.3 m, 1 lb = 0.454 kg 
a. S = sleeve, S-W = spoked wheel divider. HICs and Shippingport fuel were simulated. Contents included rebar for all
canisters.
b. Center-of-gravity-over-corner orientation.
Figure A-5. Canister internal configurations.
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Figure A-6. Canister internal configurations.
The target at the drop test facility included a flat 4-in.-thick (at the thinnest location) steel plate 
imbedded in heavily reinforced concrete (about 2 million lb [910,000 kg] total weight). The design of the 
facility provided the desired “essentially unyielding surface.”
Test Canisters 01 through 07 were dropped onto this flat surface from 30 ft (9.14 m). Test 
Canister 08 simulated a drop event onto a repository waste package. This was simulated by dropping the 
canister 24 in. (609.6 mm) onto a vertically oriented 2-in. (50.8-mm)-thick plate. Because the canister was 
not centered over the plate, it then rotated to impact another vertically oriented 2-in. (50.8-mm)-thick
plate set 78 in. (1,981 mm) away (on the other side of the waste package). Test Canister 09 was dropped 
from 40 in. (1 m) onto a 6-in. (152.5-mm)-diameter steel bar welded to the steel surface. The drop heights 
and puncture bar dimensions were chosen to follow that specified by the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR)9 for transportation packages.
The test and analytical results are as follows:
x The finite element models accurately predicted the actual deformed shape of the test canisters
after the drop events. An example of this is shown in Figures A-7 and A-8. 
The calculated material strains in the representative test canister components are summarized in 
Table A-4. 
x An average through-wall thickness strain of about 34% corresponds to Canister 05 (highest
containment boundary strain experienced by test canisters) in Table A-4. 
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Figure A-7. Test Canister 04 deformed end. 
Figure A-8. Test Canister 04 deformed finite element model.
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Table A-4. Calculated peak equivalent plastic strains. 
Peak Equivalent Plastic Strain (%) 
Pressure/Containment Boundary 
Components Skirts and Lifting Rings Representative  
Test Canister Outside Middle Inside Outside Middle Inside
18-15-00-01 7 3 6 91 17 75
18-15-06-02 9 3 10 107 21 94
18-15-90-03 40 15 26 10 10 10
18-15-45-04 33 9 36 52 33 84
18-15-80-05 57 19 42 24 20 19
18-10-90-06 44 17 31 21 10 18
18-10-90-07 62a 22a 42a 11 10 10
18-15-PW-08 20b 7b 18b 38b 38b 38b
18-15-PP-09 39 14 40 — — —
a. Peak strains due to conservative modeling of internals as discussed in report. Actual peak straining estimated below that 
reported for Canister 18-10-90-06. 
b. Reported peak pressure/containment boundary strains due to impact with second vertical plate. Peak skirt and lifting ring 
strains due to impact with first vertical plate. 
x After the nine test canisters were drop tested, each canister was pressurized to 50 psig (345 kPa) 
with air. In every case the test pressure remained constant—no loss in pressure—for the 1 hour 
monitoring period. This showed that the pressure boundary had been maintained for all 
representative test canisters after the drop tests. 
x Four of the test canisters, including the highest strained canister (05) and three other significantly 
strained test canisters representing a variety of impact angles, were helium leak tested after the 
drop and pressure testing. Test Canisters 01, 04, 05, and 09 were helium leak tested and found to 
have a maximum leak rate of less than 1 u 10-7 std. cc/sec. This was considered leaktight 
according to ANSI N14.510 criteria and additional proof that the containment was maintained. 
In addition, after the pressure and leak tests were completed on the nine canisters, one 
nondestructive examination was performed. Test Canister 18-15-06-02, which was the canister that was 
dropped with its center-of-gravity over the impacting corner, was inspected using liquid penetrant 
methods to check for cracks. The location that was checked was on the outside surface of the lower end 
skirt where considerable deformation had occurred during the drop event (see Figure A-9). The calculated 
strains were 107% at the outside surface, 21% at the mid-plane, and 94% at the inside surface (giving an 
average through wall strain of about 60%) as reported in Table A-4. The liquid penetrant test results 
showed no indications of cracks on the lower skirt outside surface. 
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Figure A-9. Location of liquid penetrant test on representative Test Canister 02. 
A-1.2.6 Summary of Standardized Canister Drop Testing Results To Date 
The 1998 and 1999 testing performed by the NSNFP on the DOE standardized canister project 
has shown that significant plastic straining of 304L and 316L stainless steels can occur during an 
accidental drop event without losing containment. 
With regard to high plastic strains on the pressure/containment boundary, the 5-in. (127-mm) test 
cans were calculated to experience a peak strain of 86% (on the surface) and an average through wall 
strain of about 50%, where the 18-in. (457-mm) representative test canister (Canister 07) experienced a 
57% peak and a 34% average. In addition, an 18-in. (457-mm) representative test canister (Canister 02) 
skirt was shown to not experience outer surface material cracking under a 107% peak surface strain (with 
an average through wall strain of about 60%).
The 1998 and 1999 tests were performed with all specimens at ambient temperatures (1329qC
[55–85qF]). The DOE standard canisters may be anywhere from 10 to 149qC (50 to 300qF) when handled 
alone (outside of another container). Because the DOE standardized canisters are made of 316L stainless 
steel, their ductility at 149qC (300qF) will be greater than at 10qC (50qF). This means that a canister is 
expected to deform more for an accidental drop at 149qC (300qF) than it would if the canister was at 10qC
(50qF). However, the canister material could strain more at 149qC (300qF) before rupturing than it could 
at 10qC (50qF). Therefore, the strain acceptance criterion is valid for an accidental canister drop at 10qC
(50qF) and is valid (though conservative) for a canister drop at 149qC (300qF). Canister temperatures may
be much higher or lower only when within another container (e.g., storage container, transportation cask, 
or waste package).
The 1999 drop testing of representative DOE standardized test canisters was performed to 30-ft 
(9.14-m) drop heights, exceeding those defined for the repository (23-ft [7-m] vertical drop, and a 2-ft 
[0.61-m] drop in any orientation). Therefore, these drop heights result in higher material strains than 
repository drops would yield.
The 1999 drop testing effort confirmed the ability of an 18-in. (457-mm)-diameter DOE 
standardized canister, in an essentially flaw-free condition, to maintain a leaktight containment after an 
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accidental drop event. In 2002 and 2003, the NSNFP evaluated the ability of a standard canister with a flaw 
to maintain containment after an accidental drop event at the repository. The maximum anticipated 
acceptable flaw size was determined using analytical fracture mechanics methods and past metallurgical test 
results. This maximum anticipated acceptable flaw size was calculated using worst-case stress values from 
repository-defined drop events for an 18-in. DOE standardized canister. The result was an elliptical-shaped 
flaw of significant size, approximately 2 in. (50.8 mm) long and 0.20 in. (5.1 mm) deep (see Reference 4). 
This size of flaw or crack, which is more than halfway through the nominal 0.375-in. (9.53-mm) canister 
wall thickness, can be easily detected using a variety of nondestructive examination techniques.  
A-1.2.7 Current Analysis Efforts on 24-Inch Standardized Canisters and Multi-Canister 
Overpacks 
In 2003, the NSNFP analyzed the 24-in. canister being developed by Foster-Wheeler 
Environmental for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Project, the 24-in.-diameter DOE standardized 
canister, and the MCO for drop events similar to those performed in 1999 with the 18-in. standardized 
canister. The MCO, because it was not developed to meet the 10 CFR Part 71.73c criteria like the DOE 
standardized canister, was analyzed for drop events identified in the WASRD. Specifically, this evaluated 
the MCO for a vertical drop of 23 ft and a 2-ft worst-orientation drop. All the analyses performed to date 
indicate that the peak strains will be within the acceptable limits as validated during the 1999 testing. 
Three NSNFP reports11–13 have been issued to document the results of these evaluations. Demonstration of 
the drop survivability of the 24-in. canisters and the MCOs occurred during 2004. Four drop tests were 
conducted to compare the analytical models and predicted canister performance against the actual drop 
test results. To date, no breaching of the canisters occurred during the drop tests, and deformations are 
within the envelope predicted by the analysis. 
A-1.3 Preclosure Safety Strategy Summary 
Based on the cost and safety advantages and the technical feasibility presented in the work cited 
above, a strategy that relied on engineering solutions (i.e., canister and canister handling equipment) to 
prevent any radiological release was selected as the preferred strategy. During the summer of 2002, 
specific activities and associated responsibilities for implementation of this strategy were identified 
during a series of workshops with the Yucca Mountain Project personnel and are documented in a 
workshop agreement.14
NSNFP activities supporting the conclusion that DOE standard canisters will withstand the 
identified drop scenarios are summarized in Reference 15. This report concludes that, as designed, the 
canister will not breach if dropped within its design basis. It also concludes that, based on inspection 
detection thresholds and the minimum critical flaw size, undetected material and weld fabrication flaws 
will not jeopardize canister integrity. The potential affects of age-related degradation that could occur 
prior to transporting the canisters to the repository for acceptance are also discussed, and a probabilistic 
estimation of a failure due to age-related degradation is provided. 
The internal hazards analysis16 prepared by the Yucca Mountain Project personnel identified 
potential drop and collision hazards during preclosure receipt and handling operations at the Monitoring 
Geologic Repository (MGR). The likelihood of a release associated with each potential event was also 
evaluated. All identified event sequences were determined to be Beyond Category 2.17 Each document is 
presently being updated to support the license application and to identify controls that will implement the 
strategy for ensuring that any radiological release from DOE standard canisters during repository 
preclosure operations will be Beyond Category 2. 
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A-2. ADDITIONAL MARGIN—BEYOND CATEGORY 2 
CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS
In addition to providing a robust canister to ensure that any radiological releases from DOE SNF 
is Beyond Category 2, consequence analyses have been performed in order to provide risk insights 
associated with handling DOE SNF at the proposed repository. Using conservatively estimated properties, 
these analyses calculated the doses that could affect an individual located on the MGR site boundary due 
to a hypothetical release associated with breach of a DOE standard canister, even though no credible (i.e., 
nonmechanistic). These calculations and their bases are summarized below. 
A-2.1 Calculation Inputs and DOE SNF Grouping 
for Dose Consequence Analyses 
Dose calculations require a source term to represent the release and MGR-specific transport and 
mitigation parameters. For each canister, the source term is the product of the material at risk, the damage 
ratio, the canister leak path factor, the airborne release fraction, and the respirable fraction.  
The material at risk is the total quantity of radiological material that is available to be acted upon 
by the event. For canister drop events, the material at risk is the total radiological inventory of the 
canister. DOE SNF radiological inventories have been conservatively estimated. A discussion of these 
estimates is provided in Appendix D of this report. 
The damage ratio is the fraction of the material at risk that is actually affected by the event. The 
damage to the canister and its contents is most likely to be localized. And the canister, cladding, and other 
structural material will absorb energy and thus buffer the SNF from the full impact of the event. 
Nonetheless, the consequence calculations conservatively assume that the entire material at risk is 
affected, and thus a damage ratio of one is used.  
The canister leak path factor (LPFcanister) is the fraction of the radionuclides that escape the 
canister. For the screening dose analyses, no credit was taken for the canister (i.e., LPFcanister was 
conservatively assumed to be 1.0). For the Beyond Category 2 calculations, a nonmechanistic breach is 
assumed. In this case, the LPFcanister is assumed to be 0.1. This is also considered conservative. Data cited 
in DOE-HDBK-3010-9418 support the use of 0.05 as a conservative value of the LPFcanister for a failed 
canister containing a fine powder. Further, the primary mechanisms for rupture involve only cracking.  
Airborne Release Fractions (ARFs) and Respirable Fractions (RFs) may be unique to each waste 
form and were determined by binning DOE SNFs into groups that shared properties that could be used to 
conservatively estimate ARFs and RFs. This process is discussed below. 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94, “Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for 
NonReactor Nuclear Facilities,” (see Reference 18) provides ARFs and RFs for various material types 
and forms under a variety of accident conditions. Because the identified hazards during the repository 
preclosure period are associated with drops or other impacts (i.e., collision/crushing forces), DOE SNFs 
were grouped into three categories with distinctive behaviors relative to these types of events. Each of 
these three categories was further subdivided to account for the condition of the fuel prior to the event 
(i.e., intact or not intact). A more comprehensive discussion of the basis for the grouping is provided in 
Reference 19. 
Fuels were binned, and ARFs and RFs were conservatively assigned to the fuels in each bin. For 
example, metallic and other fuels that may be potentially chemically reactive were assumed to oxidize 
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completely. Fuels with cladding condition poor or unknown were considered to be 100% powder. A very 
conservative correlation was used for intact fuels expected to fragment upon impact. Conservative 
parameters, such as a 10-m drop height and maximum density, were used in the correlation. In addition, 
no credit was taken for the additional confinement provided by fuel cladding or by packaging that may 
occur prior to placement in the canister. The design basis event fuel groupings, ARFs and RFs, and 
preliminary radionuclide inventory estimates were provided to the Yucca Mountain Project with 
Reference 19. 
A-2.2 Screening Dose Analysis 
The preliminary source term information provided with Reference 19 was used to develop 
preliminary dose calculations in the DOE SNF Screening Analysis.20 Using extremely conservative 
assumptions (below), this calculation concluded that ~90% of DOE SNFs would not cause doses in 
excess of 10 CFR 63 Category 2 thresholds.  
These conservative assumptions were used in screening the dose analysis. 
x No credit for canister retention (LPFcanister = 1) 
x 100% of the material at risk is impacted by the event (damage ratio = 1) 
x No credit for energy absorption by the canister, cladding, or other structural materials 
x No credit for confinement within cladding 
x ARFs and RFs determined very conservatively: 
- All fuels with degraded cladding were assumed to be 100% particulate 
- 100% oxidation assumed for all fuels that could react with potential for pyrophoric reaction  
- A bounding drop height of 10 m was used to conservatively estimate the pulverization 
factor used to determine the ARFs and RFs for nonmetal, intact fuels. 
x No credit for deposition or filtration within the facility or along the path to the site boundary 
(LPFfacility=1)
x Dose was calculated for a presumed 5 km site boundary (boundary is currently at 11 km). 
The scoping analyses provided an indication of the bounding consequences associated with a 
nonmechanistic breach of a DOE standard canister. The analyses showed that, even when using very 
conservative assumptions, the majority of DOE SNF would not exceed Category 2 dose limits. 
A-2.3 Beyond Category 2 Consequence Analyses 
Because event sequences resulting in canister breach are Beyond Category 2, dose calculations 
are not necessary. Nonetheless, to gain additional risk insights, specific fuels were selected (from those 
that showed the potential to exceed limits) for more detailed analyses. After a review of the preclosure 
safety strategy and the results of the screening dose analysis,21,22 the N-reactor fuel and the Shippingport 
Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) fuels were selected for further analysis. These fuels were selected 
because they were among the potential bad actors identified by the screening dose analysis and because 
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they represent a significant quantity of fuel. Sufficient fuel-specific information is available to support a 
more accurate calculation.  
Although still conservative, fuel-specific inputs were obtained for the selected fuels in order to 
more accurately represent the expected conditions and performance of the fuel, the canister, and the 
repository systems that mitigate the release. These included:  
x Accounting for the actual fraction and size distribution of preexisting particulate rather than using 
a bounding assumption of 100% powder 
x Accounting for a level of confinement provided by the canister by using an LPFcanister of 0.1, 
including an LPF to acknowledge the presence of a HEPA filtration system 
x Acknowledging that slow oxidation is much more likely than ignition of the bulk uranium metal 
for N-reactor fuel 
x Accounting for atmospheric dispersion over the distance of 11 km rather than 5 km to the site 
boundary.  
Calculations were performed both with and without HEPA filtration and for both the 50% and 
99.5% max sector acute atmospheric diversion factor (Ȥ/Q).23 Results are summarized in Tables A-5 
and A-6. 
As shown by these results, doses from DOE SNF are expected to be well below regulatory limits. 
The screening dose analysis calculated doses for all DOE SNF using preliminary source term 
information and extremely conservative assumptions. For the selected DOE SNFs, the Beyond Design 
Basis Event dose calculations used the same preliminary source term information but with more realistic 
assumptions related to mitigation provided by the canister and the repository systems. A dose 
consequence analyses is currently being prepared that will calculate the dose for all DOE SNFs using 
current source term information and the more realistic assumptions (presently being prepared by the RW 
management and operations contractor).
Table A-5. Beyond design basis event dose results without HEPA filtration. 
Fuel Fuel Type Fuel Condition 
TEDE
(rem) 
Highest of 
CDEs+DDE
(rem) 
SDE
(rem) 
LDE
(rem) 
10 CFR 63.111 Limit 5 50 50 15 
Shippingport LWBR Scrap 
(SNF ID #377) 
Nonmetal Not intact 
50% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 1.58E-2 1.29E-1 2.57E-5 1.58E-2 
99.5% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 6.96E-2 5.69E-1 1.13E-4 6.97E-2 
N-reactor (SNF ID #147) Other Not intact 
50% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 2.64E-3 2.21E-2 7.89E-5 2.72E-3 
99.5% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 1.16E-2 9.75E-2 3.48E-4 1.20E-2 
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Table A-6. Beyond design basis event dose results with HEPA filtration. 
Fuel Fuel Type Fuel Condition 
TEDE 
(rem) 
Highest of 
CDEs+DDE
(rem) 
SDE
(rem) 
LDE
(rem) 
10 CFR 63.111 Limit 5 50 50 15 
Shippingport LWBR Scrap 
(SNF ID #377) 
Nonmetal Not intact 
50% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 7.59E-5 1.11E-4 2.65E-5 1.02E-4 
99.5% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 3.35E-4 4.90E-4 1.13E-4 4.48E-4 
N-reactor (SNF ID #147) Other Not intact 
50% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 1.45E-3 1.53E-3 7.84E-5 1.53E-3 
99.5% max sector acute Ȥ/Q 6.40E-3 6.76E-3 3.46E-4 6.75E-3 
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Appendix B 
Postclosure/TSPA Activities 
Like preclosure, the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.113(b) specifically relate to the 
protection of the offsite public. Like the commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) SNF postclosure licensing strategy relies on the combinations of engineered and natural 
barriers to meet performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.113(b). The barriers prevent or substantially reduce 
the movement of water and prevent or substantially reduce the release of radionuclides from the waste for 
the 10,000-year regulatory period. Table B-1 identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) 
and barriers for this strategy. 
There are currently no waste acceptance criteria for DOE SNF, and the strategy does not result in 
additional characterization requirements. It is expected that the base case bounding analyses will 
demonstrate that the performance objectives are not exceeded. Thus there will still be no characterization 
requirements for DOE SNF. Therefore, the consequences are directly related to the radionuclide 
inventories. No credit is taken for cladding or fuel matrix in the DOE SNF release model, so there are no 
characterization requirements for these parameters. 
The performance objectives established by 10 CFR 63.113(b) are summarized in Table B-2. 
In consideration of the above performance objectives, the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program 
(NSNFP) postclosure/total system performance assessment (TSPA) technical activities try to answer three 
basic questions. 
1. Will the addition of DOE SNF into the repository change any of the repository’s features, events, 
and processes (FEPs)?
2. Will the affected FEPs have a greater than 1 chance in 10,000 of occurring in 10,000 years, or 
will excluding the affected FEPs significantly change the radiological exposure or radionuclide 
release?
Table B-1 SSCs and barriers for postclosure waste isolation. 
SSC and Barriers Category Description 
Upper natural barriers Important to 
waste isolation 
The topography and surficial soils and the unsaturated zone above 
the repository prevent or substantially reduce the movement of 
water to the drift.  
Waste package Important to 
waste isolation 
The waste package prevents or reduces the water contact with the 
waste form and confines the waste. Provides dry inert environment 
until waste packages breach to delay onset of waste form 
degradation. 
Other engineered 
barriers: drip shield, 
waste form, cladding, 
emplacement plug 
Important to 
waste isolation 
Even after waste package failure, the other engineered barriers will 
continue to prevent or reduce the release of radionuclide from the 
waste. (Note: For DOE SNF, waste form and cladding credit are not 
currently taken in the postclosure analysis.) 
Lower natural barriers Important to 
waste isolation
The lower natural barriers delay radionuclide movement to the 
groundwater aquifer and receptor location by water residence time, 
matrix diffusion, and sorption. Prevent or reduce the release rate of 
radionuclides to the accessible environment. 
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Table B-2. Postclosure performance requirements. 
Performance Areas Performance Objectives 
Individual protection—
releases from the undisturbed 
Yucca Mountain disposal 
system 
Less than 0.15 mSv (15 mrem). 
With a reasonable expectation that for 10,000 years following 
disposal, the reasonably maximally exposed individual receives less 
than the above annual dose.
Individual protection—
releases from the human 
intrusion into the Yucca 
Mountain disposal system 
Less than 0.15 mSv (15 mrem). 
With a reasonable expectation that, at or before 10,000 years, the 
reasonably maximally exposed individual receives less than the above 
annual dose as a result of human intrusion. 
Groundwater protection—
limits on radionuclides in 
consuming the representative 
volume of water 
Combined radium-226 and radium-228 <5 picocuries per liter 
(includes natural background). 
Gross alpha activity (including radium-226 but excluding radon and 
uranium) <15 picocuries per liter (includes natural background). 
Combined beta and photon emitting radionuclides <0.04 mSv 
(4 mrem) per year to the whole body or any organ, based on drinking 
2 liters of water per day from the representative volume (does not 
include natural background). 
A reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 years of undisturbed 
performance after disposal, releases of radionuclides from waste in the 
Yucca Mountain disposal system into the accessible environment will 
not cause the level of radioactivity in the representative volume of 
groundwater to exceed the limits above. 
3. Will the repository after the inclusion of FEPs affected by DOE SNF in the TSPA model still 
comply with postclosure public health and environmental standards? 
All the postclosure DOE SNF activities were performed by the NSNFP because the deliverables 
from the activity will help answer the above three questions. These activities were performed over the last 
several years and under the NSNFP or Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) 
personnel, which is consistent with the regulatory requirements: 
x Determine what are the impacts to the repository’s FEPs when DOE SNF are included in the 
repository 
x Screen FEPs according to RW technical criteria and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
regulations
x Retain and evaluate only those FEPs with probabilities >10-8 per year or significantly change 
radiological exposure or radionuclide releases; include the retained FEPs into nominal TSPA 
scenario or disruptive scenario model representation 
x Provide radionuclide inventory for evaluation during the nominal and disruptive events scenarios; 
consider uncertainty of estimated inventory in the analysis 
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x Provide DOE SNF degradation behaviors for radionuclide release evaluation during the nominal 
and disruptive events scenarios; conduct sensitivity analyses of DOE SNF groups to provide 
insights of representing DOE SNF as a surrogate 
x Conduct analyses on quantity and chemistry of water in contacting DOE SNF and high-level 
waste to provide insights to the impact of water quantity and material interactions within the 
codisposal waste package 
x Provide information on other radionuclide release mechanisms applicable to DOE SNF 
x Evaluate disruptive events and compared releases from DOE SNF 
x Demonstration of compliance with the postclosure public health and environmental standards 
when repository includes the DOE SNF 
- With postclosure individual, human intrusion 
- With separate groundwater protection standards. 
B-1. GROUPING OF DOE SNF FOR 
POSTCLOSURE PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Showing compliance with the postclosure standards for the DOE SNF is complex because of the 
varieties of DOE SNF in the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) inventory. The report 
Source Term Estimates for DOE Spent Nuclear Fuels1 shows that there are approximately 2,400 MTHM 
DOE SNF (excluding naval fuel) identified for direct disposition in the proposed repository at Yucca 
Mountain. This large number of DOE SNF poses great challenges in showing compliance with the 
regulatory standards. Taking on this challenge, the NSNFP held a meeting in 1998 with participation from 
the NSNFP, DOE sites, naval program, RW, and other national laboratories to consider ways to represent 
the DOE SNF in the repository.  
By using the information from the Spent Fuel Database at the time, the team recommended that 
the DOE SNF be grouped to support specific purposes—specifically for preclosure safety analysis 
(“design basis events” was the term used during early repository consideration), postclosure TSPA 
analysis, and criticality. The results of the meeting with the justifications were published in the NSNFP 
report DOE SNF Grouping in Support of Criticality, DBE and TSPA-LA.2
For the purpose of postclosure TSPA analysis, the report suggested that DOE SNF could be 
represented by 10 groups (excluding the naval SNF). The grouping was primarily based on understanding 
of the fuel’s long-term behavior, and a typical fuel for the group is selected based on the quantity of fuel 
that is in the DOE SNF inventory. The DOE SNF TSPA groups and the typical fuels for each group are 
indicated in Table B-3. Results from initial TSPA calculations and the NSNFP release rate program 
showed that a single surrogate was appropriate to represent DOE SNF. 
The DOE SNF will be represented in the TSPA-license application model as a single surrogate 
fuel. The surrogate model uses an instantaneous release where all radionuclides in the fuels will be 
available for release when the waste package is breached. No credit is taken for DOE SNF cladding or for 
DOE standard canisters. The confidence of such representation is based on analyses of the individual 
10 fuel groups. 
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Table B-3. DOE SNF groups used in the TSPA-license application. 
Fuel Group/Fuel Matrix Typical Fuel in the Group Comment 
Naval fuel Naval Fuel [151]a Info by NNPP 
Pu/U alloy FERMI Core 1 and 2 (Standard fuel 
subassembly) [456]  
Pu/U carbide FFTF-TFA-FC-1 [325] 
Mixed oxide fuel FFTF-DFA/TDFA [71] 
U/Th-carbide Fort St. Vrain Reactor [86] 
U/Th oxide Shippingport LWBR Reflect. IV [371] 
Uranium metal N-reactor fuel [991] 
Uranium oxide TMI-2 core debris [229] 
Aluminum-based fuel (UAlx, U3Si2,
uranium oxide in aluminum) 
FRR pin cluster (Canada) [660] 
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous RSWF fuel [366] 
U-ZrHx TRIGA STD [235] 
a. The number in [ ] is the fuel identification (SNF ID#) used in the DOE/SNF/REP-078 (see Reference 1). 
DFA driver fuel assembly FRR foreign research reactor RSWF Radioactive Scrap Waste Facility 
FERMI Enrico Fermi Reactor LWBR light water breeder reactor TDFA test driver fuel assembly 
FFTF Fast Flux Test Facility NNPP Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program TMI-2 Three Mile Island Unit 2 
B-2. FEATURES, EVENTS, AND PROCESSES CONSIDERATIONS 
Through FEPs screening and analyses, RW has identified and retained for postclosure a total of 
nine barriers that either: (1) prevent or substantially reduce the rate of movement of water or 
radionuclides from the Yucca Mountain repository to the accessible environment or (2) prevent the 
release or substantially reduce the release rate of radionuclides from the waste. These nine barriers consist 
of four natural barriers and five engineered barriers. Figure B-1 is a pictorial depiction of the nine barriers 
discussed in RW’s Yucca Mountain Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation.3 As part of the safety 
classification of SSCs and barriers to support the repository design, the importance of these and other 
systems are further refined. The system, subsystem, and barrier important to waste isolation are indicated 
in Table B-4. 
When DOE SNF was first considered for direct disposition, the NSNFP coordinated with the 
appropriate RW management and operations contractor personnel to determine the impact of the addition 
of DOE SNF into the proposed repository.4 As part of the DOE SNF FEPs screening, two analysis model 
documents were completed and published by the NSNFP that evaluated the impact of the addition of 
DOE SNF into the repository. The documents are: 
x NSNF/EP-3.05/001—Feature, Event, and Process Identification to Support Disposal of 
Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Yucca Mountain Repository, Revision 0 
x NSNF/EP-3.05/004—Total System Performance Assessment Disposition of Misc. Features, 
Events, and Processes, Revision 0. 
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Table B-4. Yucca Mountain repository engineered and natural barriers classified as important to waste 
isolation.
System, Subsystem,  
or Barriera
Important to 
Waste
Isolationa Basis for Classificationa Comment 
Upper Natural Barriers 
System 
Topography and surficial 
soils unsaturated zone to the 
repository horizon 
Yes Prevents or substantially reduces 
the movement of water. 
Lower Natural Barriers 
System 
Unsaturated zone below the 
repository horizon and 
saturated zone below and 
downgradient from the 
repository
Yes Delays radionuclide movement to 
the groundwater aquifer because 
of water residence time, matrix 
diffusion, and/or sorption. 
Prevents or reduces the release 
rate of radionuclides to the 
accessible environment 
Engineered Barriers System 
Drip shield Yes Prevents or reduces the waterflow 
that could contact the waste 
package and waste form by 
diverting waterflow around the 
waste package; prevents rockfall 
damage to the waste package that 
could affect waste package 
performance. 
Waste package (Outer 
corrosion barrier) 
Yes Prevents or reduces the water 
contact with the waste form and 
confines the waste. Provides dry 
inert environment until waste 
package breach to delay onset of 
waste form degradation. 
Waste package (internals) Yes Provides internal materials whose 
corrosion products sorb 
radionuclides from the degraded 
waste form in order to reduce 
radionuclide release from the 
breached waste package. Prevents 
in-package criticality for 
postclosure period. 
Waste form Yes Limits radionuclide release rates 
because of low solubilities or low 
diffusion through degraded 
engineered barrier. 
DOE SNFs do not take 
waste form credit 
Spent fuel cladding Yes Prevents the contact of water with 
the waste form for most SNF. 
DOE SNFs do not take 
cladding credit 
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Table B-4. (continued).
System, Subsystem,  
or Barriera
Important to 
Waste
Isolationa Basis for Classificationa Comment 
Drift invert Yes Limits radionuclide release rates 
through the granular invert 
material by limiting accumulation 
of water in the invert regime. 
DOE SNF Disposable 
Canister
DOE SNF (Internal) Yes DOE SNF canister internal basket 
limits the quantity of fissile 
materials could be loaded into the 
canisters. Neutron absorber, as 
needed, in the basket prevents 
in-package criticality for 
postclosure period. 
Needs to be included in the 
safety classification of 
SSCs and barriers 
documentation. 
Emplacement Drift System 
Emplacement drift excavated 
opening 
Yes The emplacement drift opening 
provides thermal hydrological 
properties and size and layout 
properties consistent with TSPA 
modeling. 
Emplacement pallet Yes Provides structural support of the 
waste package and minimizes 
potential degradation 
mechanisms. 
a. See Reference 3. 
The DOE SNF FEPs screening has identified two potential features, which are unique to the DOE 
SNF, that may impact the repository performance. They are (1) potential of a pyrophoric event—a self 
sustaining thermal excursion—in the multi-canister overpack loaded with uranium metal (N-reactor) fuels 
and (2) potential of a criticality beyond the 10,000 years regulatory period from the highly enriched DOE 
SNF. The following evaluations (NSNF/EP-3.05/002, and NSNF/EP-3.05/003) have dismissed both the 
events as having a very low probability and consequence relative to the performance of the repository. 
x NSNF/EP-3.05/002—Screening Argument for Pyrophoricity, Revision 0 
x NSNF/EP-3.05/003—Criticality Risk for Beyond 10,000 Years, Revision 0.a
A detailed analysis of a chemical reaction in a multi-canister overpack was completed as part of 
the TSPA activity in FY 2001.5 The analysis has concluded that even if the two adjacent commercial SNF 
waste packages besides the DOE SNF codisposal package were affected, such a chemical reaction would 
not increase the release of radionuclides as compared to the nominal scenario. For the potential of a 
                                                     
a. This evaluation was completed by the NSNFP. However, RW has completed a calculation called Configuration Generator 
Model6 in which RW reached the conclusion that, based on the current design, criticality in the regulatory period for all SNF (i.e., 
including DOE SNF) is less than 10-4 over 10,000 years. Thus criticality could be screened out of the TSPA-license application 
model. See Appendix C for further discussion.  
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criticality, analyses show that fissile loading in conjunction with a neutron absorber, waste package 
performance, and the amount of water enters the waste package during the regulatory period as such that 
the probability of a criticality situation will be very low (below the 10-8 per year threshold).6 For 
disruptive scenarios, the criticality potential and consequences are also very low. More detailed 
discussions of DOE SNF criticality are covered in Appendix C. Figure B-2 summarizes the DOE SNF 
FEPs screening activities that were included in the license application. 
B-3. DOE SNF MODEL ABSTRACTION 
Table B-4 indicated that the waste form is a barrier important to waste isolation, but for the DOE 
SNF, no credit is taken for the waste form or the cladding. In support of the DOE SNF in the license 
application, RW has conducted a detailed degraded behavior analysis for each DOE SNF group proposed 
in the grouping report. The analysis recommended how DOE SNF should be represented in light of the 
TSPA-license application model.7 The analysis model report recommended that “Upper-limit models 
should be used (for all the DSNFs [DOE SNFs]) in cases where their usage in TSPA analyses results in 
acceptable boundary dose, and when other less conservative models are not needed.” The upper-limit 
model is an instantaneous release model applied to the DOE SNF in the TSPA-license application safety 
case. This recommendation was based on the fact that the conservative and best estimate models are not 
currently fully validated.  
However, the analysis model report allows the analyst to choose the conservative uranium metal 
model for the license application safety case, because the conservative uranium metal model would be 
bounding for normal TSPA time steps. 
Thus the DOE SNFs were represented in the TSPA-license application with an instantaneous 
release model. The confidence of such representation was built on a number of NSNFP activities that 
provided a good understanding of the DOE SNF characteristics and behaviors under the repository 
conditions. The results of these activities indicated that DOE SNF could be bounded using an 
instantaneous release model. The activities and relationships to the TSPA-license application are 
summarized in Figure B-3. 
Several concerns relative to DOE SNF fuel behaviors in the repository included: 
x How the fuel (matrix) will degrade over long periods in the repository environment 
x How the fuel cladding will protect or not protect the fuel meats over long periods in the 
repository environment 
x As the fuel degrades, will the corrosion products contain a large number of colloids such that they 
may aid the transport of significantly more radionuclides of concern out to the accessible 
environments and thus increase the dose to the public? 
Using the above areas of concern and the DOE SNF groups identified in support of postclosure 
analysis, three activities were performed to provide the confidences that EM understands the behaviors of 
DOE SNF. The first was a literature search that may help in understanding how the various DOE SNF 
types may behave under conditions like the repository. As expected, fuel types that have been 
manufactured and used in significant quantity over the past 20 to 30 years are the fuel types that have the 
most information. However, because the interests are in the operational performance of the fuel, some 
conditions are not exactly like what is expected in the repository. However, a lot of good and useful  
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Figure B-2. DOE SNF FEPs screening activities that were considered in the license application. 
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Figure B-3. DOE SNF model abstraction activities as related to repository license application. 
information was collected and published in two separate reports covering the DOE metallic and 
nonmetallic fuels that are in the EM inventory. These reports are: 
x Department of Energy Environmental Management Review of Oxidation Rates of DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Part 1:Metallic Fuel.8
x Department of Energy Environmental Management, Review of Oxidation Rates of DOE Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Part II: Nonmetallic Fuel, Part 2.9
Similarly, a literature search was performed on the potential of colloid formation as the various 
DOE SNFs degraded in the repository conditions. Because the United States is the only country in the 
world that has selected an unsaturated repository, some of the information collected is not directly
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applicable to a repository with an oxidizing environment. Nonetheless, the indication is that the quantity 
of colloids from DOE SNF degradation should be no more than commercial SNF. Thus, DOE SNF 
colloids should not significantly increase the transport of radionuclides under the repository conditions. 
The results of the literature search were published in a report titled, Colloid Formation and the Potential 
Effects on Radionuclide Transport in a Geologic Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel.10
To provide further confidences that irradiated DOE SNF will behave similarly to the unirradiated 
material tests reported in the literature review above, release rate testing was planned on a selected 
number of DOE SNFs—specifically, the N-reactor fuels, Al-based fuels; mixed oxide fuels; and 
U carbide fuels. The fuels were selected based on the potential impact they may have on the repository 
performance. (See the Selection of Fuel Types for Release Rate Testing, DOE/SNF/REP-045.)11 Results 
from the release rate testing program were compared to the results from the literature search and were 
published in the report titled, Review of DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Release Rate Test Results.12
As summarized in Figure B-3, the information from all three of these reports has been considered 
and used in several repository documents. For the repository license application, the DOE SNF 
degradation behavior covered in References 8 and 9 have been considered and incorporated into the 
analysis model report DSNF and Other Waste Form Degradation Abstraction (see Reference 7). 
Similarly, the colloid behavior aspects of DOE SNF during degradation were covered in the analysis 
model report, Waste Form and Indrift Colloids-Associated Radionuclide Concentration: Abstraction and 
Summary.13 The DOE SNF representation in the TSPA-license application model was based on the 
recommendations from these two analysis model reports. 
B-4. DEMONSTRATION OF DOE SNF COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE POSTCLOSURE TSPA-LICENSE
APPLICATION MODELING 
As indicated in the analysis model report Initial Radionuclide Inventories, Table 2, “Waste 
Package Configurations,” RW plans to disposition 12 waste package types, totaling ~11,200 waste 
packages in the upcoming December 2004 license application submittal. The approximate ratio of DOE 
SNF waste packages to the total number of waste packages is about 1 to 3. This means that for every 
waste package that may breach and fail in the repository, there is only one chance in three that it contains 
DOE SNF or high-level waste. Thus, demonstration of DOE SNF compliance cannot be considered for 
the DOE SNF by itself but rather must be integrated and considered with all the materials placed into the 
entire repository. 
B-4.1 Historic DOE SNF Compliance Activities 
Prior to the license application, DOE SNF had been considered and evaluated with the 
commercial SNF and high-level waste as part of the site recommendation and viability assessment 
process. To support the efforts, the NSNFP developed two reports titled DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Information in Support of TSPA-SR14 and DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Information in Support of TSPA-VA15
as well as developed a source term for use in these analyses (see Reference 1). In both evaluations, the 
regulatory compliance analyses have shown that the performance of the repository, including DOE SNF 
waste packages, is below the regulatory limits. In addition, depending on the type of commercial SNF 
(i.e., commercial SNF with stainless steel or zircaloy cladding), comparison of the nominal DOE SNF 
radionuclide releases from a codisposal waste package has been shown to be about one order of 
magnitude below the releases from a commercial SNF waste package.16,17 Thus the contribution from the 
DOE SNF to repository performance may be easily bounded by the commercial SNF given the number of 
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DOE SNF waste packages and the fact that ~21% of the commercial SNFs waste package may contain 
stainless steel cladding. 
B-4.2 DOE SNF TSPA-License Application Compliance Activities 
RW’s characterization program has acquired additional knowledge of the behavior of the 
infiltration, water transport, and absorption and desorption characteristics over the last several years. The 
findings have been represented in the TSPA-license application model. The NSNFP reports, Source Term 
Estimates for DOE Spent Nuclear Fuels, Additional DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Information in Support of 
TSPA-License Application Analysis (see References 1 and 18), in conjunction with the DOE SNF model 
abstraction recommendations (Appendix B-3) form the bases of the DOE SNF representation in the 
compliance analysis. 
The DOE SNF compliance works will not be entirely completed until the license application has 
been submitted. However, based on the results from the site recommendation and viability assessment, 
both the NSNFP and RW expect the DOE SNF performance to remain the same relative to the 
commercial SNF, because the updated repository behaviors are equally applicable to the commercial SNF 
as well as the DOE SNF. In addition, preliminary TSPA runs using the ongoing license application model 
appear to confirm that conclusion. Final license application analyses and license application sensitivity 
runs for DOE SNF have been planned and will be completed during the July through September 2004 
timeframe. The final compliance TSPA-license application analyses will provide such confirmation. 
The DOE SNF will be represented in the TSPA-license application model in the following 
manner:
x Single surrogate model—instantaneous release model where all radionuclides in the fuels will be 
available for release when the waste package is breached. No credit is taken for DOE SNF 
cladding. No credit is taken for standardized DOE SNF canisters (see Reference 7). 
x DOE SNF radionuclide inventories are evenly distributed in the total number of DOE standard 
canisters estimated in REP-078 (see Reference 1). The radionuclide inventory and number of 
canister uncertainties are incorporated into the radionuclide inventories used in the TSPA-license 
application.19
As part of the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) Model/Analysis for the License 
Application document,20 RW has identified a series of analyses that will provide the validation and 
confidence for the surrogate representation of the DOE SNF in the TSPA-license application. The series 
of nominal scenario analyses include comparison of dose history results from individual fuel groups using 
the realistic degradation models, fuel groups radionuclide inventory, and canister count to the dose history 
results from the surrogate DOE SNF model. Other selected sensitivity analyses include evaluation of 
impact from specific fuel group air alteration rates, uncertainties in fuel surface area, free radionuclide 
inventory, bounding radionuclide inventory, specific fuel group canister counts, and finally the plots of 
key radionuclides that contribute to total dose from specific DOE SNF. The results of the analyses will be 
part of the above license application document that will provide supporting validation and confidences 
that the DOE SNF has been properly represented in the TSPA-license application model. 
Besides the nominal scenario, RW’s FEP screening has identified disruptive scenarios that will 
have to be considered in the TSPA-license application model. Specifically, disruptive events such as 
igneous intrusion and eruption, and seismic scenarios will be part of the TSPA-license application model. 
A number of deterministic simulations covering these disruptive cases will be evaluated. Specifically, 
DOE SNF waste packages will be part of this comparison. During such scenarios, the commercial SNF 
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with stainless steel cladding will essentially be like fuels without any cladding protection. Both the 
NSNFP and RW believe the commercial SNF waste packages will bound the DOE SNF waste packages. 
The results of the analyses will be part of the above license application document that will provide 
supporting evidence that DOE SNF has been properly represented in the TSPA-license application model 
under the disruptive event scenarios. 
B-5. DEMONSTRATION OF DOE SNF RISK INSIGHTS 
BASED ON UNDERSTANDING OF DOE SNF 
In the DOE SNF model abstraction discussion, the NSNFP presented the technical activities that 
were performed to provide the confidence that DOE has a reasonable understanding of how the DOE SNF 
will behave under repository conditions. Appendix B-3 covers the oxidation and degradation of DOE 
SNF materials as well as the potential of forming colloids that may increase the transport of radionuclides 
to the accessible environment. However, when fuels and high-level waste glass are placed into the same 
waste package (codisposal waste package concept), questions arise as to the potential interactions that 
may exist between the DOE SNF, the high-level waste materials, and the waste package and its basket 
structure. Specifically, how does the interaction in conjunction with the variability (chemistry and 
quantity) of water flowing through the waste package impact the transport and availability of 
radionuclides of interest (235U, 239Pu, 237Np, 129I, 99Tc) at the accessible environment? 
To understand the potential of such interactions, the NSNFP initiated an activity that uses the RW 
qualified geochemical modeling computer code called EQ3/6 to evaluate such interaction. However, 
EQ3/6 cannot track specific radionuclide isotopes, therefore the radionuclide species were represented by 
the element. The NSNFP has completed two reports21,22 that cover six DOE SNF groups: 
1. Mixed oxide fuel (Fast Flux Test Facility fuels) (see Reference 21) 
2. Uranium/thorium oxide fuel (Shippingport light water breeder reactor fuel) (see Reference 21) 
3. Plutonium/uranium alloy fuel (FERMI fuel) (see Reference 21) 
4. Uranium metal fuel (N-reactor fuel) (see Reference 22) 
5. Uranium/thorium carbide fuel (Fort Saint Vrain reactor fuel) (see Reference 22) 
6. Al-based fuels (melt and dilute waste formb) (see Reference 22). 
Uranium zirconium hydride fuel (TRIGA fuel), highly enriched uranium oxide fuel (Shippingport 
pressurized water reactor fuel), and low-enriched uranium oxide fuel (Three Mile Island reactor fuel) 
evaluations have been completed recently.23
A number of scenarios were considered as part of these evaluations. Under the worst condition 
using a high degradation rate for the high-level waste, low water flow rate, and suppression of certain 
mineral formation, all elements of interest were flushed out of the waste package after 100,000 years as 
compared to the base case where only part of the elements were flushed out of the waste package. 
                                                     
b. At the time of evaluation, the Al-based fuel was to be treated using the melt and dilute process prior to disposal at the 
repository. EM has since decided to directly dispose of the Al-based fuel. Although the interaction evaluation has not shown any
significant increases of doses due to the codisposal concept, additional evaluations may be required as part of the NRC request
for additional inquiry. 
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Complete radionuclide release from a codisposal waste package is highly unlikely. Even if one assumes 
that it is possible to release all radionuclides of interest from a codisposal waste package, as compared to 
the nominal case (releases about 50% of the radionuclide of interest at 100,000 years after the waste 
package breaches), the potential dose increase would be less than twice the nominal case scenarios. This 
increase is insignificant in comparison with the other uncertainties regarding the performance of the 
repository as a whole. 
In addition, a HIC was considered for the degraded fuels from long-term basin storage or small 
pieces of DOE SNF from postirradiation examination. The HIC would be fabricated out of a robust 
material like Alloy 22. The HIC would serve two purposes. First, it would be a container for handling of 
the degraded and small pieces of DOE SNF at the DOE sites when the fuel is being packaged for 
repository disposal. And secondly, it would serve as another barrier and provide additional delay of 
releases at the repository. 
An analysis was performed to consider the HIC’s performance and how the number of HICs in a 
canister may affect the repository performance. The calculation titled, “Performance Assessment of 
Disposal of Selected U.S. Department of Energy Spent Fuel in High Integrity Cans,”24 presents the 
finding of the analysis. Compared to the waste package, the HIC provided an additional 40,000 to 
60,000 years of delay in terms of radionuclide release protections. 
B-6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF 
UNDERSTANDING DOE SNF PARAMETERS 
Appendix B-3 discussed the DOE SNF activities supporting the DOE SNF model abstraction. A 
number of sensitivity analyses were also conducted as part of the TSPA-viability assessment and 
TSPA-site recommendation to understand DOE SNF parameters and how they may have an effect on the 
repository performance. The sensitivity analyses focused on the DOE SNF parameters that will be needed 
as part of the compliance analysis. 
For the TSPA-viability assessment, the Waste Form and Indrift Colloids-Associated Radionuclide 
Concentrations analysis model report (see Reference 14) presents and describes the abstraction of the 
colloids process model for the waste form and engineered barriers. Section 6.3.1.2 of the analysis model 
report discusses the colloids from the corrosion of commercial and DOE SNF. Based on the various 
reports, references, and test results, the analysis model report concluded that “There are no direct colloid 
source term contributions from commercial and DOE SNF wastes.” Thus, DOE SNF contributions are not 
required to be included in the TSPA-license application colloid model abstraction. 
B-7. OTHER DOE SNF POSTCLOSURE ACTIVITIES 
If requested by the NRC, additional postclosure analyses will be conducted. At this time, 
activities are being planned as part of future work scopes to meet the request for additional information. 
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Appendix C 
Criticality Activities Supporting 
Pre- and Postclosure 
Development of a strategy to support promotion of criticality safety relies on the guidance 
provided in Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report.1 This report presents an overall 
methodology approach starting in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 discusses the imposition of performance 
criteria to ensure appropriate criticality controls are implemented in the waste package design. 
Degradation scenarios built from the features, events, and processes (FEP) screening are described in 
Section 3.3. Such scenarios include not only those potential criticality configurations inside the waste 
package, but also the near and far field environments. 
Section 3.4 of the Methodology Topical Report describes the individual parameters and how they 
should be treated using the environmental properties of the repository. The neutronic methodology 
approach for evaluating the criticality potential (calculated keff) for the various configurations is described 
in Section 3.5. The remaining sections (3.6 through 3.8) estimate the probability of occurrence of critical 
configuration classes, their subsequent consequences, and associated risk, respectively. 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) criticality safety in the repository 
relies on this same criticality analysis methodology used for commercial fuels. The DOE SNF preclosure 
and postclosure activities are discussed in the following sections. 
C-1. DOE SNF PRECLOSURE CRITICALITY 
The strategy for preclosure criticality control is to show that DOE SNF when placed in sealed 
canisters cannot exceed the critical limit even with the addition of moderator. Single canister analyses in 
each of the nine fuel groups have shown that this can be achieved as long as the fuel/basket combinations 
remain intact. Table C-1 identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to implement the 
preclosure criticality control strategy. 
This strategy is implemented and enforced through facility controls on the introduction of 
moderator to any packaging facilities, and reliance on the integrity of the sealed DOE standard canister 
under any postulated accident condition. First and foremost, there is an expectation that any fuel loaded 
into a standard canister will be controlled under stringent drying conditions. Second, analysis of the final 
surface facility design will be performed to show that criticality is unlikely regardless of the fuel type as 
long as moderator is excluded from the canister. 
Basket designs and proposed fissile loads per canister are specific to one of nine baseline fuel 
types. Use of these baskets for other fuels will require a demonstration of how these “other” fuels are 
bounded by the baseline fuel characteristics. The baseline fuels were selected based on an expectation that 
they would provide (for fissile species, mass, enrichment, and the ability to fill at least one canister) the 
highest fissile loading per canister and most reactive parameters expected for all conceivable conditions 
subsequent to preclosure. The basis for fissile loading the other fuels in standard canisters will have to 
demonstrate a calculated keff that is less than baseline fuel calculated keff for each separate canister 
loading.2 For any condition associated with loading operations with the fuel, movement of loaded 
canisters, and credit for canister integrity (nonbreach) under design basis accident conditions, introduction 
of moderator into a DOE standard canister at any time during preclosure has been eliminated through the 
FEP screening process.3 A significant part of such an analysis relies on maintaining geometry for both 
baskets and the loaded fuels in each individual canister. 
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Table C-1. Systems, structures, and components and barriers for preclosure criticality control. 
SSC/Barrier Category Description
Facility controls on 
moderator 
Important to safety The Canister Transfer System facility will be 
designed and operated with control on moderator. 
DOE standard canister 
storage racks 
Important to safety The DOE standard canister storage racks will 
control the geometry of DOE standard canister 
arrays. For most DOE standard canisters, the 
geometry controls will be sufficient to ensure there 
is no unsafe interaction. In the event that geometry 
is not sufficient, neutron absorbers will be added to 
the racks. 
DOE standard canister 
baskets
Additional measure The DOE standard canister basket will provide 
geometry control for the DOE SNF even if the 
DOE standard canister is breached. This geometry 
control will be sufficient to prevent a criticality for 
DOE SNF even under flooded conditions. Some 
baskets contain poisons for post closure criticality 
control. These provide additional preclosure 
margin.
DOE standard canisters Additional measure Because a DOE standard canister breach is a 
Beyond Category 2 event, the DOE standard 
canister will prevent introduction of moderator into 
the canister even if moderator is allowed into the 
facility. 
Accident scenarios occurring during loading and unloading of the DOE standard canisters are 
considered for self-moderated fuels. One specialized analysis examined the combination of a dropped 
canister containing self-moderated fuel (TRIGA/UZrHx).4 As a result of the accident, fuel may be 
pulverized and redistributed inside the DOE standard canister. Based on a premise for the retention and 
interspersed nature of the poisoned basket structure, no degree of fuel degradation as a result of the drop 
would exceed the critical limit for the fuel load in a standard canister. The canister can be oriented in any 
position ranging from vertical to horizontal. Based on the results of the physical argument and probability 
analysis presented in Sections 5 and 6 of additional analysis,5 performed by the Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management management and operations contractor, all key parameters contributing 
to criticality can be screened out. In particular, criticality is shown to be possible only when neutron 
poison materials are separated from the fuel material. Physical considerations concluded that such 
separation cannot occur realistically. The probability analysis results show that the overall probability for 
reaching criticality (considering all key parameters contributing to criticality) is less than the screening 
criteria of 1.0E-04 over the entire preclosure operational period (assumed to be 100 years). Therefore, it 
was concluded that there is no criticality concern for dropping a self-moderated DOE standard canister, 
such as TRIGA, during the handling operation of the DOE standard canister in the surface facilities. 
From a probabilistic basis, there would only be seven canisters out of an estimated 3,000 DOE 
standard canisters with both the enrichment and fissile mass that are of concern for this scenario. 
Subsequent analyses are tasked to identify the most reactive package condition at least for a single, loaded 
DOE standard canister. This effort necessarily includes analyses following introduction of moderation 
into an otherwise intact DOE standard canister load. Such a moderated condition is usually associated 
with eventual package breach expected to occur beyond postclosure. A flooded canister is screened out in 
the preclosure FEP analysis that identifies nonbreach conditions for any waste package (see Reference 3). 
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Eventually there will be the specialized issue of multiple, loaded DOE standard canisters in 
arrays, both in surface storage facilities and within a transport cask. While both cases encompass 
preclosure conditions, such analyses are outside the scope of this report. The conditions and scenarios for 
DOE standard canister transport to and handling at the repository have yet to be identified and 
incorporated in appropriate designs. 
The SSCs and barriers important to safety will demonstrate that a criticality event is a Beyond 
Category 2. Beyond Category 2 analysis will include additional measures (prevention and mitigation) and 
are expected to demonstrate that the consequences of a criticality are well below the performance 
objectives.
C-1.1 DOE SNF Postclosure Criticality 
The performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.113(b) specifically relate to the protection of the 
offsite public during the 10,000-year regulatory period and do not contain any special provisions for 
criticality control. While there are no specific requirements for criticality prevention and the 
consequences are expected to be well below the performance objectives,6,7 DOE is committed to ensuring 
that a criticality is a low probability event during the postclosure regulatory period and beyond. 
Based on the low probability of early waste package failures, drip shield failure, moderator 
availability, and of significant moderator entering the waste package, criticality has been screened out. 
The Supplemental Science and Performance Analyses states, “Criticality during the regulatory period was 
screened out when early failures were screened out. Even in the unlikely event of early waste package 
failures the conditions required for criticality are not likely. The failure mode postulated for early failures 
(e.g., cracks in the closure weld) is not sufficient for criticality to occur. … Furthermore, nuclear 
criticality was considered but determined not to have a significant impact on repository 
performance.”8“Criticality evaluations for various waste forms will be conducted prior to license 
application to confirm that the repository system will meet the criticality probability criterion of less than 
1 × 10-4 per year for the entire repository for the regulatory period.” (See Reference 8.) Table C-2 
identifies the SSCs and barriers on which the postclosure criticality control strategy is based. 
Beyond the regulatory period, analyses will include additional measures (i.e., additional 
preventive and mitigative measures) and will be performed in accordance with the Criticality 
Methodology Topical Report.9 Detailed discussions of the represented DOE SNF criticality analyses are 
presented in follow on sections of this overall document. These analyses were simplified through the use 
of a representative fuel for each SNF group.10–18 The analysts confirm the suitability of the information for 
the representative fuels. These analyses demonstrate that a criticality is highly improbable when 
additional measures, such as the neutron absorbers, are considered. 
Because DOE SNF information is not used to demonstrate that criticality is below the probability 
criterion, there will be no additional characterization of DOE SNF. In addition, the analyses for 
criticalities beyond the regulatory period (i.e., the analyses performed per the Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report) do not result in additional characterization requirements. 
Postclosure conditions for loaded DOE standard canisters were based on a horizontal orientation 
within the sealed waste package. Beyond the orientation, the nonbreached condition of the waste package 
for anything other than a disruptive event provided assurance of moderator exclusion from both the waste 
package and the DOE standard canisters. From Section 3.2, “The DOE SNF postclosure licensing strategy 
relies on the combinations of engineered and natural barriers to meet the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.113 (b).” 
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Table C-2. Systems, structures, and components and barriers for postclosure criticality control. 
SSC/B Category Description
Waste package Important to 
waste isolation 
Waste package failure is a low probability event . 
Drip shield Important to 
waste isolation 
Drip shield failure is a low probability event.
Fixed and/or loose absorbers 
in the DOE standard canister 
(as required) 
Important to 
waste isolation 
The neutron absorbers ensure that a critical 
configuration is not formed even after waste 
package and drip shield failure, and SNF 
degradation.
Engineered barriers: waste 
form, cladding, emplacement 
plug
Important to 
waste isolation 
Even after waste package and drip shield failure, 
the engineered barrier system will still retard 
radionuclide transport. (Note: For DOE SNF, 
waste form and cladding credit are not currently 
taken in the postclosure analysis.) 
Natural barriers Important to 
waste isolation  
The natural barriers above the waste package will 
reduce the likelihood that sufficient water is 
available to initiate a criticality. In addition, even 
after waste package and drip shield failure, the 
natural barriers system will still retard 
radionuclide transport.  
The Repository Safety Strategy determined that “waste packages alone are predicted to prevent 
any release of radionuclides for more than 10,000 years.” The Supplemental Science and Performance 
Analyses examined waste package life expectancy and concluded: “The upper-bound profile … indicates 
that not considering early waste package failures, the earliest first breach time for a waste package is 
approximately 120,000 years, much later than the 15,000 years for the previous baseline model and the 
10,000 years of the TSPA-SR base case.” (See Reference 8.)  
In light of the low probability of moderator introduction to waste packages, any criticality 
analyses that evaluate moderated criticality do so with the goal of identifying mitigative conditions to 
ensure the calculated keff will remain below the allowable critical limit for that package. Water intrusion 
in a postclosure waste package environment introduces moderation that can promote increased reactivity 
in any waste package containing sufficient quantity of fissile material to go critical in engineered reactor 
systems. Along with this water intrusion, there is an inevitable degradation process that can contribute to 
failure of the basket and fuels, and movement of fissile material within the canister. 
A significant portion of any such analysis relies on the ability to take credit for continued 
horizontal orientation of the waste package. Such orientation is a necessary condition that precludes axial 
reconcentration of fissile material. While radial redistribution of fissile material might occur, that aspect 
can be addressed with the combination of basket durability against degradation and when necessary, the 
incorporation of neutron absorbers.
Adoption of a given basket design enforces a limitation of the total fissile loading in a given 
canister. When that approach alone does not provide a sufficient margin to ensure criticality safety is 
maintained below the critical limit under degraded conditions, the addition of neutron absorbers, or 
poisons, to the DOE standard canister becomes necessary. Some baseline fuel analyses revealed no need 
for poisoning regardless of conditions inside the waste package or DOE standard canister. Other analyses 
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used a combination of fixed poisons in alloyed basket material and, where necessary, the proposed 
addition of poisons in bead material. The neutron absorber of choice has evolved to gadolinium. 
Retention of the gadolinium in the bead material relies on the relative insolubility of the gadolinium upon 
degradation of the bead material. For the alloy material that incorporates the gadolinium in the metal 
matrix used in basket construction, the relative durability of the C-4 alloy against corrosion promotes 
gadolinium retention. All degradation analyses allow for some loss of gadolinium at predicted solubilities, 
yet retention and distribution of the remaining gadolinium in the degraded waste package allows the 
calculated keff to remain below the critical limit. The critical limits assigned to each fuel type are shown in 
Table C-3. 
Nonpoisoned canisters are generally associated with low fissile loads. N-reactor fuels were 
analyzed critically safe because of the extremely low enrichments (<1.15 % ‘smeared’ 235U). While the 
Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor fuels have a relatively high fissile loading, the fuel assembly 
construction proved impervious to degradation when subjected to EQ3/6 analysis. The Fort St. Vrain fuel 
exhibited volume limitations that preclude formation of fissile atom-densities needed to support a 
criticality when stacked in a DOE standard canister. The Three Mile Island Unit 2 debris relied on a 
relatively low enrichment (<3.0%) to remain below the critical limit within the bounds of a DOE standard 
canister.
The use of poisoning for the remaining fuel types was determined ultimately by the most reactive, 
degraded condition predicted inside the DOE standard canister. Degradation scenarios include 
introduction of moderator into a breached canister as a necessary initial condition. Subsequent 
considerations include analysis based on mobilization and differential separation of neutron absorbers 
from the fissile material inside the DOE standard canister. All these analyses dealt with the combination 
of various degrees of degradation within both the DOE standard canister and the waste package and its 
associated degradation products. 
Table C-3. Proposed fissile loads and poison requirements. 
Fuel Matrix Fuel Type 
Fissile Mass 
(kg)
Critical Limit 
(keff + 2ı)
Poison Mass 
(kg)
UAlx ATR [15] 21.7 0.93 7.21
U metal  N-reactor [991] 54.5 0.93 None
MOX FFTF [71] 42.3 0.92 9.29
UZr-UMo Fermi [456] 115.3 0.93 9.04
UZrHx TRIGA-FLIP [239] 15.2 0.93 8.90
HEU oxide Shippingport PWR [196] 19.5 0.93 None
U/Th oxide Shippingport LWBR [380] 16.6 0.92 5.03
U/Th carbide Fort St. Vrain [86] 7.4 0.93 None
LEU TMI-2 core debris [229] 13.7 0.97 None
ATR = Advanced Test Reactor LEU = Low Enriched Uranium 
Fermi = Enrico Fermi Reactor LWBR = Light Water Breeder Reactor 
FFTR = Fast Flux Test Facility PWR = Pressurized Water Reactor 
FLIP = Fuel Life Improvement Program TMI-2 = Three Mile Island Unit 2 
HEU = Highly Enriched Uranium TRIGA = Training, Research, and Isotope (General Atomic) 
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Transport of fissile material outside the DOE standard canister falls into the category of either 
near-field or far-field events. Such events require the mobilization of fissile material as a dilute 
concentration of fissile material and movement to a location that is capable of promoting a 
reconcentration or accumulation of fissile material in a more favorable geometry with a fissile 
atom-density and mass capable of producing a criticality. FEP screening arguments (see Reference 3) 
have eliminated these events on a probabilistic basis. 
At this time, all criticality events have been screened out except for seismic events (see 
Reference 3). Such an event may yet be screened out for DOE standard canisters, depending on the details 
associated with the seismic event. The potential for a criticality based on seismic event sequences is still 
being analyzed. Their impact on ensuring criticality safety for DOE SNF might yet be precluded because 
the scenario ends up as a subset of one or more degradation scenarios already analyzed in degraded case 
analyses. 
C-1.2 Demonstration of DOE SNF Criticality 
Risk Based on Understanding of DOE SNF 
Enrichments of the DOE fuels can range from depleted uranium concentrations (<0.72% 235U) to 
enriched values >93%. The higher enrichments are generally associated with smaller fuel pieces that can 
lead to higher fissile loadings in the DOE standard canisters. 
Criticality safety for DOE fuels is promoted first by limiting the fissile loading in canisters. The 
fissile load limits analyzed within each proposed canister fissile load equates to both a linear loading for 
each canister and a resultant fissile atom-density. Because of this approach, fuel canister packaging with 
DOE fuels has resulted in fissile loads that remain below the critical limit for any intact fuel condition, 
whether flooded or not, and regardless of orientation.
The horizontal orientation expected for all postclosure DOE standard canisters promotes the 
inability to axially concentrate fissile material. This initial fissile loading in each canister may be able to 
redistribute axially outward, such as sand in a pile will distribute outward with time. Such outward 
redistribution results in an increased surface to volume ratio for the system; this situation generally 
increases the neutron leakage, thereby promoting a less reactive system.  
Radial redistribution of fissile material within a canister, while not considered a condition with a 
high probability, cannot be dismissed. There are two conditions that might promote such radial movement 
of fissile material. Either condition to be considered in any criticality analysis is fuel specific. In the case 
of intact fuels, such as Fast Flux Test Facility, a breach of the SNF canister and introduction of clay 
material inside a basket compartment could promote expansion of the fuel pins outward as the fuel 
assembly degrades. The pins could move radially outward at the ends, while moderator might be 
concentrated in the fueled zone of the assembly for the most reactive case. In the case of the Three Mile 
Island canisters that contain rubble from the damaged core, spacing control of the fuel pellets was 
improbable. Multiple movements of the loaded canister between its vertical orientation during loading 
and horizontal orientation during transport complicate any criticality analyses. In this case, the goal is to 
identify the most reactive configuration based on balancing random pellet placement and void fraction 
within the SNF canister. The ability to “float pellets in space” occurs because of the unknown nature of 
the “other” debris in the canister that might create a support lattice, but for which no credit is taken for 
moderator exclusion. 
Neutron absorbers are only required in some canister or basket combinations to remain below the 
critical limit, where degraded conditions can contribute to a more reactive arrangement of fissile material 
within the confines of the DOE standard canister. Gadolinium installed in a DOE standard canister 
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provides very little neutron interaction without the water to thermalize the neutrons. However, the very 
presence of water leading to degradation of the canister contents dictates the need for a neutron absorber. 
Criticality analyses indicated five of the nine baseline fuels require some form of neutron 
absorber installation inside the DOE standard canister. For the nonpoisoned canisters, fuel characteristics 
inside the canister even for degraded conditions (lower enrichments, volume limited, durability of the 
fuel) do not result in a calculated keff that exceeds the critical limit for that fissile isotope. 
In the final analysis, FEP screening analysis has shown that water intrusion into the waste 
package is a beyond design basis event. Steps taken to ensure criticality safety beyond the postclosure 
period (>10,000 years) are mitigative, such as installation of neutron absorbers. Proof that intact 
conditions exist within any standard canister for all times after the postclosure period ends is contingent 
on a probability analysis. Similarly, behavior of fissile materials after postclosure due to eventual 
water-induced breach or disruptive events (seismic or volcanism) should only be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis for a generic waste package.
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Appendix D 
DOE Spent Fuel Database, Source Term Report 
and Chemical Reactivity Analysis Activities 
D-1. DOE SPENT FUEL DATABASE 
The National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) maintains the U.S. Department of Energy’s 
(DOE’s) Spent Fuel Database (SFD). The SFD was developed to aid in the management of DOE’s 
national and international inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The database provides a single source of 
DOE SNF data to make management decisions for handling, storage, transport, and disposal of SNF. The 
SFD contains quantitative and characteristic SNF information for all DOE-owned or managed SNF and 
provides the ability to search on a wide range of parameters. The database is updated periodically, and a 
reference version was generated to support the license application. The SFD serves as a source for best 
available existing information for all SNF under the purview of DOE. The SFD is a collection of 
information for all DOE-owned SNF. The SFD includes data fields that address the following categories: 
x Identifying Information: Fuel name, number and description of fuel units, Record of Decision 
storage site, current location, and intended disposition. 
x Physical Characteristics: Fuel cladding, compound, matrix, geometry, configuration, weight, 
volume, materials, and condition. 
x Burnup and Operating History: Timelines of thermal or electric power production history; 
minimum, average, and maximum burnup, fissile material consumed, and decay heat. 
x Heavy Metal and Isotopic Mass Loading: Beginning-of-life and end-of-life masses of uranium, 
plutonium, and thorium; and inventories for 145 radionuclides (estimated as described in D-2). 
x Unusual Fuel Conditions: Identification of modifications to the original fuel configuration and 
unique events that may have led to fuel damage during reactor operations, experimental 
examination, or subsequent handling. 
The SFD architecture is more fully described in References 1 and 2. In addition to DOE research 
and materials production reactors, records include fuels from selected foreign research reactors and 
non-DOE-owned domestic research reactors (e.g., university reactors), and all commercial fuels in the 
DOE custody. The SFD is used by several organizations including the DOE sites, Headquarters, and 
Yucca Mountain Project personnel who need information about SNF. Fuel information sources include 
fuel fabrication records, data supplied by the irradiating reactor site, and other technical documents. 
Information used to create and maintain records in the SFD is obtained from SNF storage sites. The sites 
responsible for the SNF periodically provide updated fuel information as appropriate. The data are 
checked against Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security records and Material Control and 
Accountability records. 
SFD Version 5.0.1, released December 11, 2003, was placed under configuration control and 
designated as the version to support Yucca Mountain Project information needs.3 The SFD is controlled in 
accordance with NSNFP Procedure 19.02, “Management of the Spent Fuel Database.” 
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D-2. SOURCE TERM REPORT 
DOE is responsible for storage and final disposition of nuclear fuels that span several decades of 
nuclear research and defense-related material production. To support nuclear nonproliferation objectives, 
DOE has also taken custody of many foreign research reactor fuels. Therefore, DOE SNFs come from a 
wide range of reactor types (such as light and heavy water moderated reactors, graphite-moderated 
reactors, breeder reactors) with various fuel compounds, cladding materials, and enrichments. Many of 
these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element 
and assembly geometry, reflector and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial 
and spectral properties. These fuels have been safely handled and stored for many years at DOE storage 
facilities using existing information. 
As an alternative to reliance on existing information, a methodology was developed to generate a 
conservative source term estimate for DOE SNF. DOE SNF radionuclide source terms were generated to 
support licensing analyses for the repository. Source term calculations provide estimates of radionuclide 
inventories that are used in the calculation of decay heat for thermal analyses of casks and storage 
canisters, photon emission spectra for shielding calculations, and radionuclide doses associated with 
preclosure and postclosure repository safety analyses. 
D-2.1 Source Term Methodology 
The source term methodology was developed by a team of experts representing each DOE storage 
site (i.e., Hanford, Savannah River Site, and the INEEL). The methodology is based on calculational 
techniques that have been successfully applied at the storage sites4 supplemented by the application of 
similarity principles to bin fuels into groups that can employ precalculated ORIGEN outputs to model the 
generation of activation products and transuranics at a range of decay times.5 These precalculated results 
are then used as a template that can be scaled to account for differences between fuel mass and burnup of 
the template, and the fuel being estimated. The template is selected based on matching the reactor 
moderator, the fuel cladding, the fuel compound, and the fuel enrichment with those of the fuel being 
estimated. The reasons for choosing these four parameters are twofold. First, sensitivity studies show that 
these four play a key role in establishing the neutron energy spectrum within the core, which strongly 
influences activation and transmutation. Secondly, these four parameters are known for most SNFs. When 
not known, conservative assumptions can often be made. 
By modeling various combinations of reactor moderator, fuel enrichment, fuel compound, and 
fuel cladding; templates have been developed to reasonably model a broad range of DOE SNF. These 
templates provide inventories for 145 radionuclides at 10 different decay periods, ranging from 5 to 
100 years following irradiation. To estimate an SNF source term, an appropriate template is selected to 
model the production of activation products and transuranics by matching the four selected parameters. 
Conservative assumptions were applied where needed. Precalculated radionuclide inventories are 
extracted from the selected template at the desired decay period and then scaled to account for differences 
in fuel mass and specific burnup. 
Where burnup information was not available, conservative assumptions were used. Consequently, 
the methodology includes an algorithm for estimating burnup, using available information that, in some 
cases, may consist of no more than the end-of-life heavy metal mass.  
The source term methodology provides radionuclide inventories and the associated source term, 
decay heat, and photon emission rates to be estimated for virtually any SNF for decay dates up to 
100 years following reactor shutdown. The methodology relies on precalculated ORIGEN results to 
represent other similar DOE SNF. 
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A spreadsheet application was developed to facilitate application of the methodology and has 
been employed to estimate radionuclide inventories for several hundred types of DOE SNF. The results 
(along with a summary of the methodology, inputs, assumptions, and calculations used in the estimates) 
are available in Reference 6. The source term report was provided to the Yucca Mountain Project 
personnel to support design and licensing needs relative to receipt, handling, and disposal of DOE SNF. 
Results cited or referenced in the preclosure safety and total system performance assessment sections of 
this report are based on radionuclide inventories produced by the source term methodology. The 
described methodology for estimating DOE SNF radionuclide inventories has been incorporated directly 
into Version 5.0.1 of the SFD.7
D-3. CHEMICAL REACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
Other preclosure safety considerations included the possibility of a fire, resulting from a 
pyrophoric reaction involving uranium metal SNF. Such a reaction could be initiated if oxygen interacts 
with uranium hydride on the SNF surface. The repository staff conducted simplified analyses to assess the 
potential impacts of this event sequence. Analysts conservatively assumed ignition and complete 
combustion of a multi-canister overpack (MCO) full of N-reactor SNF in the repository surface facilities. 
No credit was taken for HEPA filtration or other natural and engineered barriers to mitigate the 
consequences. These analyses indicated that the potential energy and radiological materials released from 
this event were unacceptable. Therefore, chemical reactivity analyses were undertaken to develop a more 
accurate assessment of the potential for pyrophoric reaction associated with receipt and handling of 
uranium metal SNFs.  
The following other work was performed in support of these analyses: 
1. Laboratory studies were performed at Argonne National Laboratory-West8 in Idaho and the Y-129
facilities in Tennessee to better define the kinetics and thermodynamics of the uranium 
dehydriding reaction. 
2. An existing computer code was modified and used to model different chemical and physical 
parameters describing the uranium hydride reactions and resulting heat transfer to the bulk 
uranium metal in SNF.10 As discussed in Reference 11, GOTH_SNF is a derivative of the 
thermal-hydraulic code GOTHIC, which was previously accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
The studies postulated the occurrence of nonmechanistic failures generating holes at the bottom 
and top of a vertical SNF package. These holes allowed oxygen in the atmosphere to reach the uranium 
hydride and begin the reaction. The question to be answered was how large must the holes be to allow the 
reaction temperatures to exceed a specified limit (i.e., ignition temperature of the bulk fuel metal). The 
results of the studies (see Reference 11) indicate that the reaction potential of the SNF package is a 
function of the assumed breach size in the canister wall. Studies were conducted to determine the effects 
of unequal hole sizes (i.e., one larger than the other, either the high hole or the low hole). No analysis was 
done to determine the impact response of an MCO. Further work is required to evaluate the size of 
canister breaches resulting from an impact to the canister. 
These studies concluded that the controlling mechanism for the reaction is the gas flow through 
the smaller hole of a two-hole set, regardless of whether it is the inlet or the outlet hole. Hole sizes up to 
0.75 in. in diameter maintained a controlled excursion with peak temperatures of less than the defined 
limit of 1,200qF for uncontrolled reaction and combustion. The 1,200qF-limit was based on the 
demonstrated range of the kinetic data available to support the computer analysis. Above this temperature, 
the computer code was not verified to yield correct results, and it is known qualitatively that other 
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unmodeled reactions will begin to affect the results. Thus, an arbitrary definition of combustion in this 
zone was made.
Studies also modeled the effect of an open top MCO, which allowed unrestricted gas flow 
through the system. The open top MCO analysis showed a very rapid oxidation reaction with extremely 
high temperatures of reaction. However, a flow mechanism through the SNF configuration is required for 
this event to occur. Such a flow was assumed for the analysis.  
These computer modeling studies were independently reviewed12–14 by personnel from the Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory. A second set of computer simulations was run to address modeling concerns 
raised by this review. These runs, using the modified technical assumptions requested by the Oak Ridge 
reviewers, corroborated the original analysis (see Reference 11, Appendix C), and no changes to the 
original conclusions were necessary. 
As the licensing strategy for DOE SNFs matured, reliance on preventing canister breach came to 
the forefront of the strategy. In addition to preventing any radiological release, preventing canister breach 
also precludes the introduction of oxygen and the attending possibility of a pyrophoric reaction. Although 
not directly used to make the safety case for licensing, the results and conclusions of the chemical 
reactivity analyses provide additional risk insights to help ensure safe repository disposition of DOE SNF.
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